Mayawati and opposition unity: What compulsions drive her posturing?

By allying with Ajit Jogi in Chhattisgarh, she has sent strong signals to the Congress

After Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) chief Mayawati stunned the Congress party by announcing an alliance with Ajit Jogi’s Janata Congress Chhattisgarh (JCC), there was speculation that she was forced to do so by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 

Rumours are that government agencies have tightened the screws on Mayawati’s relatives suspected of managing her ‘benami’ properties. However, there is no evidence in the public domain of any of her relatives being summoned by the agencies.
 

Moreover, any possible use of coercion by the BJP government against Mayawati on the eve of elections would be limited by the fact that it would only consolidate her Dalit vote. The BJP will also have to factor in the possibility of having to negotiate a post-electoral arrangement with Mayawati in case of a hung verdict in 2019. So BJP strong-arming is an unlikely explanation of Mayawati’s moves.

Her alliance with Ajit Jogi’s JCC has undoubtedly introduced some uncertainty to the Opposition’s unity moves. She has also threatened to go it alone in Madhya Pradesh. However, blaming the BJP is to hide the problems with the Congress leadership in these states.

It was foolish to expect that Mayawati would discuss alliance formation with her bete noir and former lieutenant, P L Punia, who is the Congress’ general secretary in-charge of Chhattisgarh. Yet this alliance was very important for the Congress. The total victory margin of the BJP over Congress in 2013 was a mere 97,000 votes. The BSP vote share in the state at 4.3% or 560,000 votes in 2013, would have helped the Congress to bridge this gap.

Mayawati on the other hand can afford to posture in Chhattisgarh. It is not a crucial state for the BSP. The party won only two seats in the 2003 and 2008 assembly elections and just one in 2013. Alliance with the JCC is unlikely to improve her poll prospects as Ajit Jogi’s party, founded in 2016, is yet to test electoral waters. Perhaps the psychological impact of the alliance was more important for her. 

She has sent an unmistakable signal that she will not let herself be marginalised by the Congress in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Her announcement of 22 candidates in MP is a negotiating posture. She apparently wants 50 seats out of 230 in the state but has stopped short to keep the dialogue open. 

Without BSP support, the upper caste leadership of the Congress in MP holds little attraction for Dalit voters. The BSP can cut into the Congress vote to the benefit of the BJP as it did in 2013 ensuring the defeat of Congress candidates in more than 30 seats. In the Bundelkhand, Rewa and Satna regions about 8 to 10 seats will be crucially dependent on an alliance with the BSP.

In Rajasthan, the combined vote share of the BSP and the Congress in the 2003 and 2008 elections was more than that of the BJP. In the 2008 assembly elections the Congress with 96 seats was only able to get a majority in a house of 200 with the help of the BSP’s 6 legislators. However it muddied its relationship with the BSP by forcing its legislators to merge with the Congress.

The Congress does not have a prominent Jat, Dalit or Adivasi leader in Rajasthan and Dalit presence in Congress rallies has reportedly been low. Mayawati may have chosen just the right moment to remind the Congress that it needs to deal in a less high-handed manner with the BSP in the state than in the past.

How the Congress accommodates the BSP by the Congress in MP and Rajasthan state elections will impact Opposition unity in the crucial state of UP for the 2019 general election. With 80 Lok Sabha seats, UP is the make-or-break state for both the Opposition and the BJP.  Major contradictions confront the prospective Opposition alliance here. The Congress is only a marginal player in UP, the problem is really between the BSP and the SP.

The SP, the BSP, the Congress and the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) have not yet reached a seat-sharing agreement which accommodates each party’s claims. Mayawati has announced that she would be willing to go it alone in 2019 if her party does not get a “respectable” share of seats in the alliance. It is being said that the BSP is pitching its demand higher than others to placate its own party leaders who are wary of an alliance with their traditional social and political rivals, the OBCs, represented by the SP.

The BSP Supremo may also want to maximise her party’s share in the alliance because she is unsure whether SP President, Akhilesh Yadav, is capable of transferring his party’s votes to BSP candidates. In the Rajya Sabha elections, he could not deliver even the votes of his party’s legislators for the BSP’s candidate. This has raised serious doubts about his hold over his party and indeed about his understanding of caste-politics.

Mayawati, on the other hand, has convincingly demonstrated that she has the ability to transfer the votes of her supporters in the by-elections in Phulpur, Gorakhpur and then in Kairana.

So it makes sense for Mayawati to bargain hard in UP. Especially because she cannot go with the BJP before the general election. The huge Dalit consolidation against the BJP cannot be ignored. Some sections of the Muslim community which support her might also leave if she were to negotiate with the BJP now.

Mayawati’s choices may have been further circumscribed by the sudden and unconditional release of Bhim Sena leader Chandra Shekhar Azad. He is a young charismatic leader from her own caste with a considerable following. He has declared openly that he is against the BJP. Although he has said that he would do nothing to harm Dalit unity, Mayawati does not know what his next move would be and at whose behest. Mayawati will have to work harder to keep her flock together by strengthening her anti-BJP stance. 

What she does after the elections, however, is another matter. 

The writer is a journalist based in Delhi. He tweets @bharatitis