Needed: A de novo assessment of capability

Naval Assemblies are more than just about pomp and show

Much has been written in recent weeks about the International Fleet Review hosted by the Chinese Navy (PLAN) at the port of Qing Dao in which two Indian naval ships also participated. Similarly, the next few days will see joint naval exercises between the Indian and French navies, termed Varuna, on the west coast of India with aircraft carriers and nuclear submarine participating. Many think of such interfaces as mere spectacles; others ascribe to them a somewhat larger dimension. The truth lies somewhere in between. 

There is, of course, ceremony and spectacle including parades, but at the core of such gatherings is the theme that participants are on good terms with the host nation. So, there is something of diplomacy, leave aside the naval nature of these events. International Fleet Reviews carry a message and intent. The premise that they are meant to symbolise the host navy’s prowess is simplistic. That is known widely and followed closely and does not need to be proved through displays.

Then come the exercises, joint as they are termed such as the one scheduled to take place early next month. Both India and France are major Indian Ocean maritime powers with coalescing interests in the region. Such exercises are an annual feature of interfaces at sea between our navy and those of the USA, Russia, UK, Australia, Japan, Singapore; the scope of each depends on the operational needs of the participants. With some navies, exercises at sea termed “Passex” are routinely done as part of port visits. Engagements of the first category enable professional interaction at sea and enable us to review our own practices but more important, sends a message to others that the bilateral interface flows from mutuality of strategic maritime interests; the Passex variety are less substantive but still have value. All of them essentially flow from a diplomatic synergy.

This is the context in which International Fleet Reviews and Joint Exercises at sea should be seen. They are not just gatherings of naval ships or ceremonial show but a visible demonstration of how nations wish to interact with respective host nations. Foreign policy and resultant diplomacy motivate them and they are, therefore, a reflection of how participating nations view their maritime interests and seek to safeguard, even enhance them. Only maritime forces — read navies — possess this intrinsic capability to symbolise the national interest in this manner. Hence, such events are increasingly being used internationally in concert with foreign policy objectives. 

French Rafales and Indian Navy MIG 29 flying past INS Vikramaditya during the joint exercises

This brings us to how India deals with its maritime interests and interfaces them with others in the manner that it does. Even though it is essentially the major Indian Ocean regional power, its interests stretch across the Indo-Pacific theatre given that more than half of its overseas trade traverses that route. It is for this reason that its ships are deployed in the South and East China Sea waters routinely, interacting with navies of several littorals and participating in events such as the one recently held in Qing Dao. These deployments are, naturally, not as extensive as in the Indian Ocean where our interests are clearly more dominant. What happens in the waters of the North Indian Ocean is a primary concern and the southern littorals which sit astride access to them such as Seychelles, Mauritius and Mozambique and those more south — namely, France (Reunion Islands) and South Africa are important as they can act to our advantage or otherwise. It is for this reason that one hears of operating facilities being sought for our maritime forces in that region. The northern waters extend from the eastern entries which come through South East Asia to the western routes leading up to the Suez Canal. This is the context in which our maritime interfaces should be seen. They are visibly naval but they flow from the larger national interest.

Does India have the wherewithal to meet the challenges that this geopolitical seascape poses is a question that may be asked including whether we are over-bidding, to use a Bridge term. The answer is both yes and no. We are, even as of today, the major regional maritime power and must be able to deploy wherever that may become necessary. We can also extend this reach through our island territories and the ability to operate large aircraft from airfields in southern India, leave aside carrier borne air power. There are weaknesses, no doubt, such as in our force level of submarines, in ships capable of carrying men and materiel over distances. Unfortunately, defence allocations, as a percentage of GDP, have been among the least in the last few years inhibiting strengthening of capabilities. It seems unrealistic to expect that this can be remedied anytime soon given competing demands but what is possible is that relative shares of land, air and naval power be critically reviewed and readjusted. Our existing approach is not much more than continuation of perceptions formed over six decades with some small adjustments here and there. The need is for a holistic and ‘de novo’ assessment of our national security interests and matching military power.

The writer has been member of the National Security Advisory Board. He is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command