The government has released an interim order banning 59 mobile phone applications, including TikTok and UC Browser, that have links to China. Much remains uncertain about the nature and implementation of this supposed ban — are only fresh downloads forbidden? If some Chinese-owned apps comply with data localisation requirements, will they be allowed back on the Indian internet — and, if not, what is the logic for permitting apps like, say, Paytm to continue? And, most important, what is this supposed to achieve? What is the threat perception from these apps? These questions underline the larger strategic confusion with which the government has responded to the new environment of hostility following the killing of Indian soldiers in a confrontation with the People’s Liberation Army along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh.
The fact is that the government is in a difficult position. As the Ladakh clash recedes into the past, it is clear that India’s levers over the Chinese leadership are not as strong as would be desirable. Given the current military preparedness and abilities, maintaining a long-term standoff or even a sufficiently exhaustive and forbidding watch along the LAC and international border is a difficult if not unmanageable endeavour. Meanwhile, on the economic front, it has become eminently clear that attempts to damage the Chinese economy or isolate India from it will have a more profound impact on the Indian economy itself. While some argue that trading with China hurts many Indian producers, it is also a fact that trading hurts mainly the less efficient Indian producers. In fact, most protectionist moves will set back attempts by the government to increase the ease of doing business and investor confidence in India. Further, they will hamper the reinvigorated attempt to integrate India into the global supply chains. India is not alone in facing this double-edged sword: The United States, for one, which has a far larger economic hammer to bring down on China, has nevertheless seen that its trade war has significantly hurt several vulnerable sectors, such as agriculture.
While a medium-term strategy is certainly needed to address Chinese aggressiveness, it must be both coherent and play to India’s strengths. These include an underutilised navy and a positive image with potential allies. Thus, there are significant diplomatic rules of the game that now need to be laid down at the highest level. These could have a far more lasting impact on the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific than any knee-jerk reactions such as banning apps. Diplomatically, India must now begin evaluating its position at multilateral forums. In the new rules of the game, no alliances, tacit or open, should be permitted with China at levels such as the World Trade Organization or the UN Convention on Climate Change — even if they are “developing country” groupings. Indeed, India should seek to detach like-minded developing countries from any China-led blocs. This will require significant diplomatic effort. But it will be both cheaper and more effective in the medium and long term than most current measures that have been announced.
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