Imagine a top-down, hierarchical, pyramidal organisation where every individual’s position is the resultant of an opaque process involving factional power struggles of various kinds.
Imagine that the only reason these power struggles are under control is that individuals have a common interest in keeping the pyramid intact.
Imagine that positions in the pyramid, especially those at the top, are up for renewal, implying massive changes down the line.
Imagine that at the eleventh hour, just before the baton passed, there is uncertainty on whether the designated man at the top of the pyramid would really get to don the mantle. Questions that people thought were settled begin to look less settled. Questions that were unsettled become incendiary. A move of marginal opportunism higher up in the pyramid can cause a disproportionate shake-up lower down.
This is what is happening with the Communist Party of China at this time. In the late evening of his life, the astute Deng Xiaoping sought to protect his legacy and avoid the upheavals that have historically accompanied a change of guard in Beijing by putting in place a process that would ensure an orderly, generational transition of power while ensuring the party’s absolute hold on political power. To ensure its success, Deng chose both his successor and his successor’s successor. At that time there was scepticism both within and outside China as to whether it would work. But it did, and for two decades China enjoyed a political stability that coincided with a remarkable economic take-off.
This year, when China is simultaneously facing a host of unprecedented domestic, economic and foreign policy challenges, its leadership transition process has run into a storm.
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Bo Xilai, a high-profile contender for membership of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the topmost echelon of the party’s pyramid, met with a spectacular downfall. Then the top leadership ended its summer retreat without the expected announcements ahead of the upcoming Party Congress.
Last week, it turned out that the man selected to be the party’s general secretary and the state president, Xi Jinping, had not been seen or heard of since early September. For several days there was no word on his health or whereabouts — only official stonewalling by government spokespersons. It has been reported that he might be variously suffering from a back injury, a heart attack or a stroke. There remains the possibility that Mr Xi has already fallen victim to the party’s intramural factional strife.
Even after Mr Xi just as inexplicably reappeared in public, the uncertainties created by his absence have already made the pyramid a little more wobbly. Such instability is unlikely to upset the Communist Party regime yet, for the country has far more of a collective leadership today than it had even during Jiang Zemin’s presidency. It will, however, be reflected in China’s policies over the next few years, at least until the new PSC has had the time to evolve a fresh equilibrium.
The composition of the PSC is of greater consequence than whether Mr Xi ascends the presidency or his place goes to Li Keqiang, the previous frontrunner. On the one hand, the PSC could be expanded from nine to 11 members to accommodate a wider range of factional interests. On the other hand, it could see its membership shrink to seven in an attempt to curb factionalism. The decision lies in large part with the outgoing PSC, its predecessors and other factional leaders. At such a juncture, the influence of the state security apparatus and the People’s Liberation Army becomes more significant than usual.
What this means is we might see a “coalition with Chinese characteristics”. The regime leadership might no longer be as decisive as before, at a time when it needs to be. China is facing economic slowdown, eroding wage competitiveness, increasing tensions in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, and strident nationalism among the population. On the external front, it has vitiated relations with almost all its neighbours, many of whom are far more adversarial today than in 2002 when Mr Hu became the general secretary.
One area where the wobbliness of the party’s pyramid could dangerously affect other countries is through the escalation dynamics in maritime East Asia. A combination of China’s expansionist claims, the United States’ pivot back into the region and provocative actions by regional countries has taken the situation along disputed maritime areas in East Asia to the brink. China has a multiplicity of state agencies and non-state actors acting on its behalf. The tussle for power in Beijing complicates civil-military relations, heightening the risk that conflicts will escalate.
Late last week, Chinese civilian law-enforcement ships faced off the Japanese coast guard after the Japanese government bought a few disputed islands from a Japanese private citizen. The Philippines is involved in a similar stand-off over Scarborough shoal. Both Japan and the Philippines are treaty allies of the United States. Few want war, but preventing one requires China to be able to prevent the situation from escalating into one.
The author is founder and fellow for geopolitics at the Takshashila Institution, an independent public policy think tank