Pak security, Indian opportunity

NSP contains clues for improving relations

Pakistan’s National Security Policy (NSP), an abridged version of which was officially released late last week, offers the first comprehensive view of the political-military-intelligence establishment’s approach to its internal and external challenges at a critical juncture in its 75-year existence. The 110-page document, which was cleared by the Pakistani Cabinet on December 28, is valid for the five-year period 2022-2026 and subject to annual revisions. But the fact that the policy has been in the works since 2014 suggests that it represents a distillation of rigorously debated and considered views of all stakeholders and power players. For this reason, the 48-page version in the public domain deserves attention from the international community, particularly India, with whom relations have arguably touched a nadir.

Some commentators have dismissed the NSP as representing an extended wish-list and ambitions of a failing state, especially given the post-Afghanistan diminution of its relationship with the United States and troubled ties with its new ally China. Certainly, the eight sections of the public document contain many formulaic pronouncements, not least in its assessments of Jammu & Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations. Stating that India had “illegally occupied” J&K, the NSP goes on to identify Hindutva-led politics as a threat to Pakistan’s security in terms of political exploitation — demonising Pakistan during elections, for instance — that provoke military adventurism (a possible oblique reference to the Balakot action). In this context, it is interesting that though the NSP underlines the state’s Islamic credentials, it describes Pakistan as a diverse country that would ensure equality for all.
 

It is possible, however, to look beyond the standard rhetoric embedded in the NSP to aspects that could open the door for improving relations in constructive ways. First, the NSP has laid considerable emphasis on the economy, reiterating that without economic security — which includes raising the potential of the long-ailing Pakistani economy — the state cannot enjoy either “traditional” or external security, or internal security, a reference to emerging sub-nationalisms. Extending from this is the NSP’s focus on Pakistan’s geo-economic position as a nodal point between West, South, and Central Asia. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is mentioned in this context, though it also points to India’s “regressive approach” in stalling suck linkages. This outlook offers India the opportunity to engage with Pakistan outside of the straitjacket of the J&K paradigm, especially since the ceasefire of February 2021 seems to have held.

It is possible for New Delhi to focus on closer economic ties. Indeed, India can play a constructive and mutually beneficial role in facilitating linkages with the rest of South Asia and maximise the potential of its own infrastructure investments. One immediate way of doing so is by re-opening existing road and rail links and expanding ready-made border customs infrastructure — the Wagah border, for instance, has a vast and under-utilised facility — to enable a two-way flow of trade traffic. Despite these glimmers of opportunity, however, it is important for India to keep its expectations grounded. For all its focus on geo-economic linkages, the NSP accords just one sentence to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, though it has offered to host the next summit. In other words, Indo-Pak relations have been there and done some of that before.