The overall national logistics network comprises the military as well as the civil logistics network with varying degrees of overlap. Until now, the two have existed in silos, a skewed fallout of the legacy of the military staying out of civilian affairs. A relatively empty railway station at a far-flung cantonment, a colonial legacy borne out of logistical compulsions of the times has been a familiar sight to those who have travelled across the length and breadth of the country.
As the population grows and cities expand at their peripheries on the Indian mainland, albeit unplanned, the urban sprawl touches the gates of our airbases or circumscribes the military stations and cantonments ending their isolation. Hence, more than ever the urban logistics, military logistics and trade logistics routes meld by default. A passing military convoy that shuts commercial traffic, temporarily closing of the roads by military and air force authorities near their bases are usual reminders of capacity constraints. During the 26/11 attacks, the National Security Guard team's arrival from Manesar to Mumbai was delayed as it was stuck in Delhi-Gurgaon road traffic en route to the airport, a particularly grim reminder of our logistical inadequacies when travelling across a jumbled network. It would be difficult to quantify the true economic and social costs of such a failing, though they are enormous.
In the border areas, the logistics infrastructure developed to meet only the military requirement is deficient both in quality and in quantity even for this sole task. The existing stock of logistics infrastructure consists of sparse, narrow roads, and a few airstrips and helipads dotting the inaccessible regions. The railways are yet to touch the farthermost boundaries. Again, poor logistics facilities or the absence of it in the peripheral regions has been the legacy of our war with China more than five decades ago. The intent behind not constructing roads and railways in these areas was to deny our adversary the means to reach the heart of mainland India.
As we lay our misplaced apprehensions aside in the changed geopolitical circumstances and emphasise "Make in India" for surging trade, we would need to integrate our trade logistics network at least with the greater Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) region, if not merge it completely with "one belt, one road". The imperatives of national security notwithstanding, the security forces would see a metamorphosis in their role in border areas as they aid movement across the network for purposes other than military. This would be analogous to what the Indian Navy has been doing in the blue waters of the Indian Ocean - securing the shipping lanes for commercial activities.
Moreover, it is not that the military would need the civilian logistics facilities only in case of a contingency, which the Mirage 2000 trial landing practised or the civil logistics network would need to rely on the military facilities only as a last resort, say, during a natural disaster. As a result, the evolving trend in the national logistics landscape is the increasing convergence of all forms of logistics routes and facilities for multiple usages rather than exclusively for any singular purpose.
This trend, however, intersects with another evolving trend of security and the confluence of two trends poses a set of challenges to the national logistics assets. Apart from the changing nature of conventional warfare to urban warfare, asymmetric threats by terrorist groups are becoming increasingly common all over the world. India, in particular, has been the victim of this scourge. The trade logistics and urban logistics grids would be highly vulnerable to such attacks compared with military logistics networks. Therefore, our growing economic strength would necessitate a concomitant increase in security requirement.
In January last year, the National Transport Development Committee, comprising secretaries from ministries ranging from shipping, aviation, coal, power and urban development, submitted its comprehensive report, a masterpiece containing an analysis of various transport modes and suggested a road map ahead. But it betrayed its lopsided approach towards national logistics planning as it omitted members from the armed forces, paramilitary and the police.
As we review our national logistics assets from the perspective of strengthening two important pillars of our national power, economic and military might, we will need to plan and build new logistics sub-networks, upgrade the existing ones and identify complementarities. Inputs from and collaboration with security experts and the armed forces would be mandatory prior to undertaking such a task. As a silver lining, the huge deficiency in existing logistics network and slow pace of their development partly due to lack of capital, availability of land and environmental clearances still presents an opportunity to rectify the mistakes of the past. In line with the evolving trends and keeping constraints in mind, developing a unified logistics network-after taking commercial, passenger and military requirements into account-would be most economical and efficient. This would also be the most sensible option as we tread a common path.
The writer is a supply chain management and logistics professional with the Indian Air Force.
These views are his own