These two groups of islands (or rock structures or reefs) are the subject of sovereignty-related disputes between China and the other littoral states, principally Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. Based on what belongs to whom, come into play issues of maritime rights - territorial waters, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf within which countries can exercise rights of exploration and exploitation of undersea resources. China has claimed ownership of both these groups based on "historical evidence", and has unilaterally taken possession of some and indulged in reclamation and construction; this has included the building of airstrips on two of them in the Spratly group.
Over the last decade Chinese charts also began to show a "nine-dash line", which cover about 80 per cent of the SCS, justifying it on the basis of some maps put out in 1949; left unsaid was what this line actually signified. Some said that it was meant to convey ownership over the sea space that it enclosed while others felt that it was merely a line drawn to include the two island groups to assert China's sovereignty over them. In some Chinese representations to the United Nations the line was included while in others it was not, giving rise to further ambiguity, possibly deliberately engineered by the Chinese.
So, the bones of contention are two: one, sovereignty over the two groups and two, maritime rights arising from them. The latter flow from parameters set out by the United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which SCS littorals including China are signatories. Stemming from this discord, Philippines took the Spratly issue to an International Tribunal permissible under the norms of the UN; China disassociated itself from any arbitration. This Tribunal made its award known some weeks ago.
Even though China was not party to the arbitration and has summarily rejected the award, the seminal features of the ruling cannot be ignored. The Tribunal has not concerned itself with the issue of sovereignty. This is something which the parties involved would have to settle through other means, e.g. bilateral or multilateral negotiation. However, on the issue of maritime rights, the award is specific and lends itself to no ambiguity.
First, it has not accepted the validity of the "nine-dash line". It has ruled that UNCLOS automatically extinguished all historical or previous rights of member countries regarding maritime jurisdiction. Second, the islets of Spratly do not constitute land areas which can reasonably be expected to sustain habitation, being merely rocks or reefs and, therefore, cannot be used to claim either EEZ or the continental shelf. Third, in reclaiming some of these outcroppings and making constructions thereon, China has caused serious environmental degradation. The sum and substance of the award is that regardless of which country owns or exercises sovereignty over the Spratly group, they cannot be used to determine maritime rights, and the EEZ, and the continental shelf must be drawn from the mainland of the littoral country.
While China has vociferously disparaged the award, its stance appears to have undergone some nuanced change. First, the "nine-dash line" finds no mention in the official Chinese response. Second, and more importantly, this statement, unlike earlier ones which had only focused on the Spratly, brings into play "all island groups in the SCS", which covers the Paracel too, where at least one island could possibly fall under the category of being "habitable" and, therefore, qualify as a determinant of maritime rights. Here the main contesting littoral is Vietnam, which is exploring the EEZ for oil and gas, some of it in collaboration with an Indian company. China's claimed EEZ, based on ownership of the Paracel, overlaps that of Vietnam, and the latter may well follow the arbitration route at some time. This is how things stand. While the Tribunal's award has no enforceability, it has certainly put China under international pressure.
Where does India come into the picture? Since half our overseas trade passes through the SCS, freedom of navigation in those waters, and peace and tranquility in that region is important to us. The conflicting claims of the littorals have the potential to create instability which can affect free movement of shipping. Therefore, on the issue of sovereignty, India's position has consistently advocated a peaceful settlement through negotiation.
On the other hand, issues of maritime rights are of great and immediate relevance. India is presently involved in joint venture exploration in the Vietnam EEZ which conflicts with the Chinese claims, and there have been protests from China. As and when we pursue similar activities in other countries, say Philippines, the problem will get aggravated. Once seabed mining technology is perfected, India will seek greater participation in exploration activities in countries which seek our help. All of this will come into conflict with the Chinese claims. Therefore, clear demarcation of maritime zones in the SCS between the littoral states is important to India. These interests are not yet such that the country should proactively intervene (as the Americans are doing through "forward" patrols by their ships and aircraft), but we should fully support the Tribunal's rulings.
To sum up, India has no role to play in the determination of sovereignty in the SCS, but has interests in freedom of navigation and tranquility in those waters. It also has a stake in the exploration of undersea resources in different littoral countries, which seek its assistance. The Tribunal award is categorical that lines drawn by any country with Spratly as the fulcrum have no legality regardless of their ownership. This the Chinese must accept. Given our "Act East" strategy and economic interests, peaceful resolution of the outstanding issues is important. Within the bombastic rhetoric of China in rejecting the award, there may be some toning down of the earlier position. Until then we have to watch carefully. Meanwhile, proactive engagement with the littorals of the western Pacific should continue to be an important constituent of our national security strategy.
The writer is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He has also served as member of the National Security Advisory Board