Countries have either been or are continental powers or sought predominance at sea. Great Britain, the United States and Japan fall in the latter category while others like Russia, Germany and France, have tried but not been able to transform themselves from being essentially land focused entities to maritime profiles. This is because that requires certain geographic pre-requisites of which easy and unhindered access to open seas is an important one; equally, there is need for governments which understand what maritime power is all about and they then go about creating and exploiting it to further the nation's interests. These attributes are not easily found. Yet, as history has shown, no nation can really become a great power unless it is a power at sea.
Despite its two-coast configuration, dozens of ports on both sides and access to open seas, India has always been a continental country. There were kingdoms which did take our culture to distant lands across the seas but not our power. All invaders, those who came and went and those who stayed to rule, came from across the land borders in the north. The Europeans did come in their ships but had to fight no great battles at sea; they only required a few limited skirmishes on land as kingdoms, big and small, were added one by one to the fold that ultimately became India. In independent India, power at sea was never seriously in the consciousness of our political leadership till as late as the war of 1971 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi first saw its potential. Rajiv Gandhi gave it further meaning in the mid 1980s. From a paltry 4.7 per cent of the Defence Budget in the mid-1960s, the figure reached 13 per cent two decades later and close to 18 per cent by the turn of the century. This is positive movement but we are far from having become a maritime nation.
China is in worse straits. A one-coast country, its access to open seas can be seriously constrained by any determined adversary of which the USA and Japan are two; this situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. Equally important, the narrow channels of South East Asia seriously inhibit its ability to deploy seagoing forces in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), on which it depends for much of its energy and trade. These are critical to attaining the maritime stature that it now seeks for itself coupled with the One-Belt-One-Road initiative. It may be able to obtain facilities here and there such as at Gwadar in Pakistan, but so can others elsewhere as has Japan. In any event, these, by themselves, cannot ensure credible operations. So, assessments that China can soon become a power of consequence at sea are somewhat optimistic.
India faces another major decision point in its search for a maritime face. America has consistently advocated an Indo-Pacific role for us with joint naval patrols in the South China Sea, most recently during the visit of US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter. We ourselves have begun to adopt a profile which is veering to 'Act East' from 'Look East'. For example, Indian warships now routinely deploy in the South and East China Seas and visit ports in those regions, exercising with littoral navies. Yet, for the US, the Indo-Pacific only seems to start from our eastern seaboard extending into waters of the western Pacific; it does not see major roles for our country westwards.
So, Indian participation in affairs relevant to Afghanistan is downplayed as also its interests in South West Asia; here, Pakistan is the 'prima donna'. Some Indian strategists, therefore, advocate that India should structure itself essentially as an IOR player. Yet others, being more ambitious, want the field to be expanded to Asia-Pacific. In terms of maritime influence and responsibilities, this means abilities that extend from the Suez Canal on one side to waters of the Western Pacific on the other. So, which of these postures fits in with our interests and are doable within our present and likely capabilities, is the dilemma.
Even though half of our overseas trade now transits the South China Sea and tranquility in those waters is important, confrontation with China will not ensure it. Similarly, sovereignty issues in those waters between littorals are neither relevant to us nor impinge upon our interests. We must protest any actions in those waters which could jeopardise safety of commerce and freedom of navigation but actions such as joint patrols with others should not be part of the menu. An Asia-Pacific profile will also not have credibility, at least in the foreseeable future; it can await better days. On the other hand, an IOR role is both credible and commensurate with our valid interests that stretch across the Indian Ocean. In this space, India's interests and responsibilities must be those of the major littoral power able to reach places of its choosing and operate credibly for as long as it needs to. We are also better placed than the Chinese to deal with issues in the IOR than in waters farther away and can dominate its entries and exits. This will need maritime forces significantly more than are presently there but not a level that we cannot reach if we plan for it systematically. Interestingly, given clear political direction, these goals are achievable with a less than 20 per cent share of the Defence Budget and predominantly through the 'Make in India' route. This approach will also contribute to development of maritime infrastructure in the country, a necessity now recognised at the highest levels.
In short, India's maritime posture needs to be refined. Without compromising on our long-term interests we must clearly identify our core area and that must be the IOR. This expands our operating space sufficiently without compromising any vital concerns. Such a posture will, in the next two decades or so, result in maritime assets and capabilities which will be credible and commensurate with what we will need. Will this make India a maritime power? On this, the jury could well be out for some time.
The author is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command.
He has been member of the National Security Advisory Board
He has been member of the National Security Advisory Board