Given the compulsions of the emerging strategic environment, many have welcomed this as a significant and desirable reorientation. Some have suggested that the pact, if it is that, satisfies American interests. Others consider it a further recognition of India's importance in the new geopolitics of the world. In some way, all of this is true; in another, we may be hyping things not justified by ground realities.
The first Memorandum on India-US Defence Cooperation was signed in January 1995 following the proactive direction of the then prime minister, P V Narasimha Rao. This was an elementary start envisaging simple joint exercises at sea and other military exchanges. By 1996, we had two shaky United Front governments in office and no progress had been made. In 1998, India became a nuclear weapons state and that led to American sanctions being imposed. Meaningful cooperation in the defence relationship, therefore, effectively commenced only during the George W Bush administration.
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Since then, most aspects visualised in the 1995 document have gathered momentum. The Malabar series of exercises between the two navies have picked up and similar engagements between the air forces and the armies of the two countries have gathered strength. In the last decade, outright purchases of military equipment have entered the category of cooperation, with equipment worth over $14 billion either already procured or on order - although, sadly, without any "Make in India" content. The transfer of technology is still to make headway, though some proposals are under discussion.
In 2002, the Americans proposed that the two sides contract some agreements which, in their view, were important for closer defence cooperation. These were the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement on Cooperation for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA). The US argued that it had such contracts with nearly 100 countries, those with whom it had military alliances as well as those which did not fall into that category and that these agreements facilitated cooperation.
All three aroused considerable concern in New Delhi. The last two, by their very nomenclature, led to apprehensions about treading into uncharted territory, while the first, though fairly straightforward, was seen as a stratagem for positioning American military assets in India and their subsequent operation from chosen locations, even though the language of the document gave no such indication. For whatever reason, including the approach of the then defence minister, no progress could be made on any of the three proposals, which were now being termed "fundamental". It is the LSA that has now been concluded under the acronym LEMOA; the other two still remain in limbo.
It is interesting to see what kind of logistics support either country can give to the other under the LEMOA. When ships or aircraft or land forces operate together, such as in joint exercises, port visits or in rescue and relief operations - as in response to the tsunami (2004) - they need to replenish fuel and provisions. These can be purchased from the local markets by paying cash. But the process is a bit complex because foreign exchange transactions are involved. In some instances, local vendors might not be able to meet the demand for, say, large quantities of fuel. In contrast, naval tankers and depot ships can easily provide the needed items, especially at sea, where no other facility exists. However, they are not equipped to handle cash transactions.
A bilateral arrangement puts all such transactions into a book of accounts in which no money changes hands. Thus, if an Indian warship draws fuel from a US tanker or a shore-based agency at a port where the US has assets, the cost will go to the Indian Navy's debit and similarly, when an American ship draws these items in a port where an Indian Navy facility exists or at sea, the transaction will be to our credit. This book-keeping can, at intervals, be matched and settlements made between governments.
This is what the LSA sought to provide, nothing more and nothing less. Unfortunately, on our side, this was construed as providing base facilities that could also be used for operations. In the LEMOA, the language has been readjusted to avoid even the remotest connection to the usage of shore facilities or to conjoined operations, except as provided in the agreement, namely, for joint exercises and rescue and relief operations.
There is nothing either strategic or sinister about the arrangement. Indeed, there is no reason why we should not have similar arrangements with some of the other countries with whom we have defence cooperation linkages, such as Japan, Singapore and Australia.
It is just our style that such a straightforward and nondescript arrangement is being seen as a strategic game changer. Some analysts have gone as far as to compare the import of the LEMOA to the India-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1971, completely ignoring the fact that one of the clauses of that pact required each country to treat an attack on the other as an attack on itself. But for it, chances are that the Chinese would not have kept away from the India-Pakistan war of 1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh. This same agreement led the then Soviet Union to continuously thwart all attempts led by the US in the Security Council to enforce a ceasefire until our mission was accomplished. To compare that kind of a contract to what has recently been signed is ridiculous.
This is not to suggest that a strong India-US strategic convergence is not essential to safeguard the security interests of our country, or that mutuality of interests does not require close engagement between our two countries, but only to caution against being carried away by acronyms and rhetoric. Indeed, it is reasonably certain that India will not be signing the two other pending agreements any time soon. They have deeper content and require the kind of contractual content that the US has with its Nato allies but which have little relevance for India, which seeks as much to maintain close defence cooperation ties with Russia as with the US. To plagiarise the Bard, it's a case of much ado about nothing.