This is just the navy story. In the air force, the Rafale deal continues to meander along more than three years after this aircraft was shortlisted as the chosen platform. The effective strength of fighter squadrons is now down to less than 30 against 42 approved. And as for the army, procurement of wheeled guns, tanks, missiles, night vision devices, assault rifles, bullet proof jackets, all continue to flounder despite serious shortages highlighted to Parliament's Standing Committee. The defence allocation of Rs 2.47 lakh crore in 2015-16, less than eight per cent over expenditure committed in the year about to end, and with most of the amount provided for modernisation earmarked for schemes already in motion, offers little prospect of any real progress. Altogether, this makes for rather dismal reading.
The first prerequisite for modernisation is long-term planning. It is not that the armed forces do not draw up perspective plans in good enough time; the roadblocks lie in the manner in which this is done. The very start is faulty, as these plans are not linked to availability of funds. These plans are being drawn up on the facile assumption that a certain percentage of the GDP, say three per cent, would be available through the period for defence spending. This itself is wholly unrealistic given that over decades the annual allocation has not exceeded two per cent; it was less than 1.9 per cent this year and has reduced still further to 1.75 per cent in the next.
The first essential in defence modernisation is to correlate long-term planning with funding. It is not necessary that this be done over a 15-year period, or as a percentage of GDP. Based on an assessment of the country's estimated revenues and expenditures over a more realistic time frame, say five years, resources available for military preparedness should be indicated. This is not impossible. As far back as in 1973, a D P Dhar-led Apex I group had recommended such an allocation based on which the 1974-79 Defence Plan was finalised. Two years later, when inflation and devaluation of the rupee made this figure unviable, an Apex II group headed by P N Haksar was set up and based on its recommendation, the allocation and plan were updated. In 1985, once again, a resource allocation of Rs 65,000 crore was made for the period 1985-90 and a matching defence plan formulated. It is not surprising that in these instances, the percentage achievement of planned targets was much higher. Since then, this process seems to have fallen apart. For nearly two decades, we have largely operated on five-year plans for which there has been no assured funding and more than once, a full five-year period has been gone through just based on accrual of annual budgets. There is no way in which such methodology can lead to effective defence planning which, in any event, is constrained by long lead times from concept to delivery.
The indigenisation story is also a sad one. For several decades, India's defence modernisation has revolved around a three-pronged mix of 'buy', 'buy-and-make', and 'make', and this has resulted in creation of some fairly credible capacities such as in ship production. Why the triad has not shifted more noticeably to 'make' is because the required skills and technology simply do not exist in the country. In several critical areas such as advanced weapons and sensors, sophisticated aero engines, composite materials or high-performance gas turbines, self-reliance is nowhere in sight.
Consequently, the only viable route at this time, if modernisation is desired, is essentially the 'buy-and-make' process where we buy some, get technology transfer to manufacture the follow-on systems and keep making incremental improvements locally; the Israeli Barak anti-aircraft system being developed for naval ships is an example. This may seem unpalatable but there is no alternative if the urge to make things in the country is to be matched with the need to be sufficiently capable militarily. Fortunately, higher-end technologies are now being offered for transfer more easily than hitherto.
There are other weaknesses too, insipid private sector expertise, despite tall claims to the contrary, being only one. DRDO continues to remain stretched across a needlessly broad spectrum rather than focused on critical technologies as it should be. These deficiencies cannot be overcome overnight. But there is a silver lining. For all their shortcomings, defence public sector units have developed capabilities which private companies simply do not have and will take some years to acquire. Therefore, it is necessary to plan holistically, enmeshing the totality of available expertise and importing where essential. If not, ten years from now, we will still be importing two-thirds of our needs, with robust modernisation of the armed forces, driven mainly through indigenous content, continuing to remain a distant dream.
The author was Director General, Defence Planning Staff