Interestingly, while India participates in bilateral exercises with several countries, big and small, the Malabar setting is the only larger grouping - and its significance lies not in the number of countries participating but in who they are. Most multilateral engagements at sea are either between countries that are part of a military alliance such as NATO or more cosmetic than anything else and, therefore, the trilateral Malabar is something unique.
The US is very much the major maritime power in the Indo-Pacific. Its strategic interests, as the prime global power, stretch across this entire region despite diminishing reliance on the energy resources on which it was once dependent. It maintains significant naval presence both in the Western Pacific and in the Indian Ocean which cannot be matched by any other power, littoral or otherwise. Its several military bases enable it to deploy and sustain military forces of considerable strength; this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
India is nowhere in this league; but, in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), it is the largest and most capable maritime power. Its geography and two-coast configuration, with outlying island territories, permit a kind of surveillance capability that no other littoral can hope to match and this gives it a dominating presence over the critical energy and trade routes that move across the North Indian Ocean.
This reach could be expanded further with cooperative interfaces with some strategically located littorals - e.g. Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives and South Africa on one side and the nations of Southeast Asia on the other. Its interests in maintaining this profile and in safeguarding free navigation at sea are co-terminus with those of the US.
There is, therefore, a clear synergy in the bilateral setting of Malabar which has been ongoing for nearly two decades and the content of the exercise has been continuously enhanced with participation of major war vessels from both sides including aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. There is both logic and substance in the continuation of this interface.
This brings us to Japan. Until some years ago, it was reluctant to be a party to even bilateral interfaces with countries other than the US and Australia, with which it has had military cooperation agreements. It was only in 2008, after Shinzo Abe visited India in his first term as prime minister, that a modest exercise between navies of the two countries was initiated. Over the years, this reluctance has diminished considerably as Japan has begun to appreciate the threats to its energy lifelines running across the IOR and the role that India can play in safeguarding them.
At this same time, the situation in the waters of the Western Pacific has become tense with serious sovereignty issues amongst littorals both in the East and South China Seas, Japan being one of them; China is a party to all of them. Despite being a very important trading partner, China is being seen as a country which can be a potential adversary or at least, hostile to Japanese interests.
China is also a country that assertively seeks change in the existing equations, seeing itself as a global power on par with the US. This has aroused concern in most littorals of East Asia, Japan included. India has had its own history of unhappiness with China, the unresolved border dispute being only one. So, for all of them, China is a question mark.
These converging interests have contributed to getting the three countries closer together, and the trilateral Malabar exercises are a manifestation of this interface. The fact that they are seen as benign and have good relations with almost all littorals facilitates the arrangement.
As stated earlier, China had taken umbrage at this engagement earlier. At that time, India had been particularly sensitive to its sensibilities and discontinued such exercises. The situation has changed a great deal since then. For one, China no longer sees India as an inconsequential power, which it did some years ago, but one which - even if not in its own league - can play an important role as a swing state in Indo-Pacific strategic equations and, therefore, a country which it should engage. On its part, India is more confident and less apprehensive of what Chinese reactions to such exercises might be. It is also more reassured of its relations with the US and Japan even as it seeks to further its interface with China.
In short, China is less likely to take the stiff position that it did earlier to such trilateral exercises; on the other hand, there are indications that it, itself, wishes to establish stronger engagement with India at sea including through bilateral exercises. Statements made during the May visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China reflect this changed approach. On its part, India will not as easily succumb to Chinese pressure as it had done in the past. So the trilateral Malabars have come to stay and given the mutuality of interests of the three participating countries, are steps in the right direction.
Such exercises can be seen, at one level, as routine professional interactions between navies of different countries which generate mutual trust and confidence in operating together. They are also a good yardstick with which to measure one's own professional skills. Planning staffs get good ideas of the methodologies and doctrines followed in different navies.
But they are also a reflection of the larger relationships and the inter-linking of strategic interests as they, inevitably, flow from political direction and are not stand-alone. They send a message which is widely visible and easy to read. As the strategic environment in the region becomes increasingly focused on the maritime scenario, exercises such as the trilateral India-US-Japan Malabar have to become an important constituent in the broad menu of engagement of countries defining their strategic interests and the routes they need to take to safeguard them. This is the real significance of the interface, and India must be proactive in contributing towards its strengthening. Malabar must become known for more than just the curry.
The writer is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He has also been member of the National Security Advisory Board.