On the 59th anniversary of the Republic, an important question faces the country: what arrangements should be made when the Prime Minister is unable to carry out his duties? The Constitution has no provision for an “acting” Prime Minister; and there are no automatic stand-ins as there are for occasions defined by protocol — if there is no President, the Vice-President stands in; and if there is no Vice-President then there is the Lok Sabha Speaker and the Supreme Court Chief Justice. That is why it was the then chief justice, M Hidayatullah, who ceremonially welcomed the visiting President Richard Nixon in 1969 (President Zakir Hussain had died, Vice-President V V Giri had resigned to contest the presidential election and his opposing candidate was the Speaker, N Sanjeeva Reddy). But what if the Prime Minister is undergoing surgery, or is laid low by a stroke but is still alive? Then the issue becomes not just protocol (which can be trickier because the Prime Minister wields real power) but also the government’s coherent functioning.
A moment’s reflection makes it obvious that there should be a deputy prime minister who automatically takes charge, or a designated cabinet minister who stands in—for both of which the Constitution has to provide for an “acting” Prime Minister. This may not be an integral part of the Westminster system as it has evolved, and convention will dictate that no non-essential decisions should be taken in such a situation since the President has invited the Prime Minister (and no one else) to head the council of ministers. But routine functioning must continue, and emergency situations have to be dealt with. In the immediate case, there are the prime ministerial responsibilities at the time of Republic Day (among other things, who will parley with the visiting Kazakh president, and who will lay the wreath at the Martyrs’ Memorial?). But it could just as well be the Red Fort speech on Independence Day.
The problem is not solved by asking specific ministers to take on additional responsibilities (as Pranab Mukherjee has been asked to do); nor is it enough that a stand-in minister chairs meetings of the Cabinet and of key Cabinet committees. These have been done in the present case, but what if the Prime Minister is incapacitated without warning? In the immediate case, there is also the problem that the Prime Minister was already handling too many additional portfolios (finance, information & broadcasting). Now Mr Mukherjee has to handle them as well as his original charge of external affairs, which is a full plate by itself. This paper had argued, when P Chidambaram was moved to home two months ago, that the country needed a full-time finance minister; that is all the more obvious now, when a recuperating Prime Minister will simply not be able to take the double- and triple-load.
Providing for a deputy prime minister who will be an “acting” PM when the occasion demands it, will also take care of the situation when the Prime Minister dies in office—as has happened on three occasions. On two of them, a kind of pro-tem appointment was made (Gulzari Lal Nanda in both cases) till the ruling Congress could make up its mind on who should be the next head of government. In the third case, some liberties were taken with the Constitution and Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in before the Congress’ parliamentary party could meet and elect a leader. It might be argued that when solutions have been found in all cases so far, nothing needs fixing. But that is simply not the case when there is so much ad hocism going on while Dr Singh undergoes surgery. The obvious solution is to provide for a formal stand-in arrangement, and to amend the Constitution accordingly.