Quad has little relevance to India

As a strategic necessity, the quadrilateral grouping comprising India, the United States, Japan and Australia is an idea whose time has yet to come

There has been much talk in strategic circles in recent times about formation of a quadrilateral (Quad) comprising India, the United States, Japan and Australia. In fact, a group of officials of these countries at a relatively low level has already come into being. Yet, while some argue that these four nations have mutually compatible strategic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific, others are not convinced that the required synergies, which are prerequisite for such a combination, in fact, exist. 

The Quad actually owes its origins to the maritime domain. Starting in the 1990s when India-US ties improved following the collapse of the erstwhile USSR, the driver of that interface was defence cooperation, in which bilateral naval exercises between the two navies called Malabar came into play. Over the years, these bilateral operations at sea grew in strength and complexity until they reached a stage when aircraft carriers and submarines were fielded without hesitation. A decade ago, Japan was asked to join these exercises, followed (for just one year) by Australia, which is when the term Quad first came into being.

China raised objections to this ganging up of major navies ostensibly against it, and India also had some reservations regarding the expansion. Therefore, for the last several years, Malabar has been a trilateral annual naval engagement, alternately in the Indian Ocean (Bay of Bengal) and the waters off East Asia. In this same time, the India-US and India-Japan interface has seen political elevation, with annual 2+2 (foreign and defence ministers’) meetings.

The question as to why these countries need to relate with one another in this manner is something that outside observers could well ask. After all, India does engage with several other countries bilaterally in defence cooperation and is interactive in multilateral groups such as Asean economically. It is also part of other combinations, BRICS, RIC and SCO being only three. However, none of these — unlike the US-India-Japan grouping — are seen to have strategic connotations.

For India and the US, this content is visible for all to see. The Indo-Pacific is of primary concern to the latter and if the Indian Ocean region has primacy for India, affairs in the Pacific also have importance, given that more than half of its trade passes through those waters, and this is increasing. Both are major trading partners, the two largest global democracies with a substantial population of Indian origin in the US. The US, unlike India, has no boundary disputes with China but has serious differences with it both in trade and its aggressive postures in the South and East China Seas, quite apart from its aspirations to become a rival super power.

Add to this the defence relationship, which has led to the US becoming the largest supplier of military platforms and systems to India. There are no visible weaknesses in this bilateral, other than some of America’s policies vis-a-vis Iran and Russia, which could prove embarrassing impediments to our need for healthy relations with those countries. As recent events have shown, these are not insurmountable. In sum, there is a clear strategic mutuality of interests.

This brings in Japan, a military ally of the US and a major economic power, even though existing India-Japan trade is not much to write home about; nor has defence cooperation reached beyond Malabar or translated itself into transfers of military hardware. Yet, strategic issues put it in a different category. For one thing, Japan is almost wholly dependent on its fossil fuel energy lifeline running from the Gulf through the Indian Ocean (IOR) and then onwards through the South and East China seas. Along with American support it can manage the eastern waters but to safeguard its interests in the IOR, it needs India.

For another, like India, Japan has ongoing territorial disputes with China in the East China Sea and is also seen by the mainland Chinese as an adversary, this despite a booming trade relationship. These two factors make Japan a potentially useful partner for India in Indo-Pacific affairs. Add to this India’s interests in the South China Sea and Japan’s significant maritime capabilities, and the mutuality of interests becomes clear. Japan can still not be rated on a par with the US as a strategic partner, but has the potential to strengthen the triangular relationship. So, it is desirable to have this country in the same side.

The fourth leg of the Quad, presently only formally, is Australia. Our trade interface is not much to crow about. It is the largest supplier of coal to China and also has no territorial or other dispute with that country. It is a US military ally but from India’s point of view, there is little in common between our interests and those of Australia, leave aside the semantic one of safety of movement at sea; this, in any event, is the interest of every seafaring nation and even those that are landlocked but need the sea for movement of their trade.

This alone does not make for a credible strategic relationship between our two countries or add anything substantial to our leverages. Australia is an important maritime power in the IOR and needs to be engaged, but that still does not enhance its claim to be a player of substance in the Quad.

The triad of India, the US and Japan which emerged from Malabar stands on a unique footing. Not only will these countries be three of the four largest global economies by 2030 or so, but each of the participants feels that the others can contribute to the furtherance of its strategic interests. For each of them, the growing power aspirations of China are a matter of concern.

There are, no doubt, some weaknesses in the interface that have been highlighted here which, hopefully, will be overcome in the years ahead. And the relationship needs to be nurtured. Meanwhile, the Quad as currently configured may continue, but clearly, as a strategic necessity it is an idea whose time has yet to come.   

The writer has been a member of the National Security Advisory Board