Veerappa Moily, the law minister, has talked of introducing judicial reform, and of bringing to Parliament a Bill that will mandate wealth disclosures by judges. While many kinds of reform are needed and desirable, two simple steps should be given precedence. The first is largely, if not almost entirely, in the government’s domain and relates to the appointment of judges—far too few exist, and far too few are being appointed. The list of vacancies on the bench is long and in some high courts more than 50 per cent of the posts are vacant. If the single biggest problem facing the country’s judicial system is inordinate delays, then the single step by which the biggest dent can be made in the problem is appointing judges.
Admittedly, there is a problem in finding suitable candidates, and the average quality of people who adorn the bench may have declined over the years. But even an average judge is better than having no judge at all.
The second step that should be taken is to limit the number of hours for which a case can be argued; the meat of any case should be stated in written submissions. This reform of judicial procedure will also reduce the number of adjournments given because lawyers ask for them (which also raises the costs that litigants have to bear). This will help dispense with cases much faster than today, and help clear the mountainous backlog of cases.
As for disclosure of the wealth of judges, the Chief Justice has raised questions on the issue, and it is just as well to put it beyond doubt and questioning by passing an appropriate law. After all, if all parliamentarians can be expected to make such disclosures, there is no reason why judges should be exempt. But it is worth asking what useful purpose the disclosure by parliamentarians has served, other than making the facts known. The country now knows how many parliamentarians are in Merrill Lynch’s tally of 84,000 Indians whose net worth is more than a million dollars (Rs 4.85 crore), and so Parliament has been shown to be a club of plutocrats mostly. But if the intended result was greater financial integrity on the part of parliamentarians, it is hard to argue one way or the other on whether this has been the actual result, because no parliamentarian is expected to explain any sudden increase in wealth.
The problem lies in the information that is disclosed, or not disclosed.
Parliamentarians merely report their assets, with a break-up to show the form in which the wealth is held—land, shares, bank deposits, etc. There is no corresponding disclosure with regard to liabilities; the result is that no one knows the net asset position. Nor is there any disclosure on how much of the increased wealth is on account of revaluation (i.e. share prices having gone up, or a flat being worth more than before), and how much because of fresh accretions to the total—which would be key. Indeed, there is no standardisation of format—some MPs disclose wealth at book value, others at market value. This renders the figures meaningless, because no one knows what they mean, and hence no comparisons are possible.
If Mr Moily now asks judges to make the same kind of disclosures that parliamentarians do, then he might as well save himself the bother, because the information will be of no use to anyone. A meaningful set of disclosures should show gross and net wealth, the reasons for growth in asset value, and the annual income earned. It is only on this basis that the public will get information that is of real value.