Rafales and self-reliance

The “Vertical Charlie” by a lone Dassault Rafale stole the show at the Republic Day Parade 2021, we are told. For the Indian Air Force (IAF), the arrival of the third batch of Rafales the next day marks a less vertical ascent, but nevertheless, an overdue process of generational upgrade in combat capability. Just as 68 years earlier, when Dassault’s Ouragans arrived at Palam and ushered the IAF into the era of jet fighters.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, while formally inducting the first Rafales into the IAF at Ambala in September last year, made headlines with a warning to India’s adversaries. His French counterpart Florence Parly’s insightful comments on the same occasion were less well reported. She described the Rafale as an “incredible sovereign tool” which gave India an edge over the entire region. Highlighting our friendship and common attachment to democracy, and a rules-based order, she noted that it “takes a lot of confidence for India to bet on France and a lot of confidence too for France to share with India, a capability that is close to the core of our sovereignty, and our strategic autonomy — the result of investments over decades”.

“Investments over decades”; sobering words, which emphasise that strategic autonomy is acquired by implementing policy not just declaring it. The French achievement of atmanirbharta (self-reliance) resulted from investments backed by patriotic dedication, and political consensus, over the long haul. During World War II, Marcel Bloch, who had founded the aircraft company now known as Dassault, was brutally treated in the notorious Buchenwald concentration camp because he refused to collaborate with Nazi occupiers. He survived, and though partially paralysed, rebuilt his company, renaming it “Dassault” (assault), which was the code name for his brother Gen Paul Bloch who fought with the underground French Resistance. By 1949, Dassault enabled France to join the US, USSR and UK with its own jet fighter when it launched the Ouragon. Dassault continuously upgraded the aircraft and won its first export order in 1953 — to India! 

Having absorbed the lessons of defeat in WWII, the leaders of post-war France backed the rapid growth of technologically advanced defence industries, in both the public and private sector; and they were supported by a bureaucratic leadership committed to national security. Consolidation through mergers, using PSUs for specialisation, emphasis on R&D — with funding of prototypes and even pre-production contracts by the French air force — enabled the emergence of world-class aerospace companies. Dassault used imported Rolls-Royce engines for the first Ouragons; a decade later, its Mirage III using French engines became the first fighters to fly at Mach 2. 

For Charles de Gaulle, independence meant there should be no enduring external or internal constraints on the ability to make decisions in the national interest. Therefore, France had to be equipped with an independent nuclear deterrent, have adequate land and air combat forces and a blue-water navy. Self-reliance was not achieved cheaply -- France regularly spent 5-6 per cent of its GDP on defence in the early years of build-up. But military programmes went hand in hand with currency reform, economic integration with European partners, industrial retooling, and 500 per cent increase in R&D expenditure. Defence expenditure fed into the rapid economic growth of the 1960s, and declined as a percentage of GDP, even while growing in absolute terms. The emphasis on “buy French”, pursuit of joint ventures, and support for diversification into space and civil aviation helped in developing national champions, which made France the world’s third aerospace power. The national champions built up large and diverse vendor bases of competing suppliers and sub-contractors, many from the MSME sector, and enhanced ties with the country’s technology institutes.

Our goal of a self-reliant India calls for a similar roadmap for national security starting with willingness to invest in defence capability. We last had leaders who ensured adequate budgetary allocations for defence back in the 1980s. It was then feasible for the army to take decisive initiatives, which safeguarded our borders, such as in Siachen (1984) and Sumdorong Chu (1986). But that era came to an end with a prime minister driven out of office largely by a defence scandal. We have not fully recovered the loss of nerve since that time. Last year, defence expenditure — as percentage of GDP — touched lows last seen in 1962.

The scandal also became a template for regular intervention in India’s affairs — and made defence acquisitions a tortuous process. So much so, that a decade ago, Dassault, though confident that the IAF preferred the Rafale for its MMRCA, was sceptical about whether the toxic political atmosphere around the bidding would allow an appropriate decision to be taken. They were even lukewarm about taking a Rafale to the Aero India show in Bengaluru and were finally instructed by President Nicolas Sarkozy to do so! The Rafale did win, but the process ended with a drastically reduced order. By that time the rightist Sarkozy was replaced by the socialist Hollande, and he in turn by the centrist Macron. All gave support to Dassault in seeing the deal through, an example of consensus on their national interest.

India seeks self-reliance even as it faces the strategic challenge of a real two-front threat scenario. This calls for defence requirements to reacquire budgetary priority, and a reassessment of procedures for evaluation, and acquisition of defence requirements; not hasty purchases amidst a crisis as we saw last year. And decision-makers must be empowered to function without fear of being targeted later as part of political vendettas. This will call for freeing national security from political and ideological partisanship — a process which only the government can initiate.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary and former Ambassador to France