The flow of credit to the farm sector has, in fact, consistently been buoyant - exceeding the targets every year - ever since 2003-04 when, in response to farmers' suicides, the government and the RBI began strict monitoring of the priority sector lending. It got a further boost in 2006-07 with the introduction of the interest rate subvention mechanism, which brought down the effective cost of agricultural loans from seven per cent to four per cent. Besides, relentless pressure on the public sector banks to open their branches in unbanked areas and the implementation of the Rs 13,600-crore revival package for the co-operative credit structure seem to have begun impacting agricultural lending.
This year's remarkable upswing in farm credit can additionally be attributed to at least three more factors. First, the farmers' credit needs had increased due to drought in some states, notably Maharashtra and Gujarat, and the rainfall deficiency at the beginning of the monsoon season in many areas, necessitating re-sowing. Higher expenses on key farm inputs, including fertilisers, pesticides, diesel and labour, pushed up credit demand. Second, the RBI has cracked down on "indirect" credit, forcing banks to lend more funds directly to farmers. Third, relatively slack credit demand from other sectors forced banks to concentrate more on agriculture.
It is unfortunate that some in the government are trying to read this growth in agricultural credit as an achievement. If it were an accomplishment, then it would have eroded the relevance of unorganised sources of agricultural finance such as moneylenders. That hasn't happened. In any case, a sizable part of the credit repeatedly lands up with the same set of non-defaulter farmers, regardless of whether they invest these funds in agriculture or recycle it to make easy profits. Unless these issues are suitably addressed, the real purpose of making cheap finance available to farmers remains unserved.