Russia & India: Reading between the lines

The officialese does not reveal why India plays a weaker hand with Russia than China

The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant and Indian arms imports from Russia highlight good Russia-India ties; a continuation of the Indo-Soviet amicability that survived after Russia became the successor state to the former USSR in 1991. 

But official statements often conceal more than they reveal. This is true of the Joint Indo-Russian declaration, signed by President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi as they celebrated 70 years of ‘Indo-Russian’ diplomatic ties and friendship on June 1 at the St Petersburg Economic Forum. Nevertheless, Russia had broader regional interests in wanting India and Pakistan to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) a week later in Astana — and Moscow did New Delhi no favours. 

First, the Joint Declaration wrongly says that ‘Russia unwaveringly supported India in its struggle for independence’. (In fact, post-Soviet Russia is not the Soviet superpower). Joseph Stalin condemned the Indian National Movement and Nehru’s post-Independence government as counter-revolutionary agents of western imperialism. 

Only after Stalin’s death in 1953 did Indo-Soviet ties improve. The high-water mark of the relationship was the 1971 Indo–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, which was signed as the US used military-ruled Pakistan as the gateway to establishing diplomatic ties with Mao’s China. Pakistan was then committing genocide in East Pakistan — which, with Indian intervention, eventually became Bangladesh. In 1993, post-Soviet Russia and India confirmed their constructively peaceful tie in the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, and in 2000, in their Declaration on Strategic Partnership. 

Currently, the apparent agreement on international relations conceals much. The Statement hails a ‘multi-polar global order in international relations’. As members of BRICS, its New Development Bank and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Russia and India do challenge the western-led economic order. But BRICS is stymied by Sino-Indian tensions. Moreover, a ‘multi-polar global order’ implies international recognition of China’s growing economic and military clout. Does India really want this?    

More worrying are Russia’s closer ties with China and Pakistan — two all-weather friends who claim parts of Indian territory. India sees their ties with Russia through the lens of its bilateral disputes with China and Pakistan; Russia views them through its global lens. The Statement bypasses the shifting attitude of Russia towards India. In 2014, Russia downgraded military technical cooperation with India from exclusive to preferred partner as it broke its arms embargo on Pakistan. And Moscow’s strategic embrace of Pakistan, displayed in its first joint military exercise with the latter last year, annoyed India. 

DIVERGENT VIEW PM Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the St Petersburg Economic Forum on June 1. India sees its ties with Russia through the lens of its bilateral disputes with China and Pakistan; Russia views them through it global lens. (Photo: Reuters)

Russia and India pledge ‘to combat international terrorism’ and call on the global community to respond ‘without double standards and selectivity.’ But Moscow fears that fighting in northern Afghanistan could spill over into its Central Asian back garden, and that ISIS militants could threaten the security of that region and southern Russia.  Wanting ISIS militants in Af-Pak to be crushed, Moscow sees its security interests ‘objectively’ coinciding with those of the Taliban over their common enemy, ISIS, and best safeguarded through dialogue with the Taliban and their Pakistani mentors. 

As for trade, Russia welcomes more Indian investment in Central Asia, and a free-trade agreement (FTA) between the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and India is to be discussed. India faces stiff competition from China. India’s trade volume with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan combined is less than $1 billion; China’s is $50 billion and Russia’s $30 billion. Unlike Russia and China, India does not neighbour any Central Asian country, and has no direct transport links with the region. The Russia-China summit in March 2015 proposed the linking of the Russia-led EEU with China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR). A preliminary agreement between the EEU and China could be signed in 2018 as the first step towards the potential creation of a free trade area. 

India hopes that the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) — initial members were Russia, India and Iran — could promote its connectivity, bilateral and regional cooperation with Central and West Asia. The INSTC could reduce the journey between Mumbai and St Petersburg from 40 days to 20 days. But even if the corridor is completed, as intended this year, its users will face a Byzantine maze of rules in the different countries that will join it. 

Significantly, Russia does not view the INSTC as a counter to China’s OBOR.   

Indeed, India must contend with Russia’s endorsement of China’s OBOR which puts the historical and contemporary spotlight on Central Asia. Last month, Putin himself attended the OBOR conference in Beijing, which India boycotted. Meeting Xi Jinping on the sidelines at the SCO meeting in Astana, Putin reiterated that OBOR had won extensive international support. 

What will India actually offer Russia? Here, too, India must contend with competition from China. Current Russia-India trade stands at $7.8 billion — down from $10 billion in 2014. The two countries hope to raise it to $ 30 billion over the next five years. Trade between China and Russia jumped 26.2 per cent year-on-year to $24.7 billion in the first four months of 2017. 

Russia welcomes Indian investment in its Far Eastern region. But China and Russia are already planning to set up a joint regional investment fund with a total amount of 100 billion Yuan (around $14.5 billion) to bolster the development of Russia’s Far East and Northeast China.

Russia, like China, will use the SCO prioritise its own Asian interests; perhaps increase cooperation with China (and maybe Pakistan) to advance them.  Changing priorities define the new Russia-India tie. 

The author is a visiting professor at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, New Delhi.