Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s recent visit to India came at a critical juncture. Recent happenings in Afghanistan have jolted the confidence of those ranged against jihadi terrorism. It seems a matter of time before Western forces withdraw from that country. And the time may come sooner rather than later. The first indications came with President Obama’s policy statement at the end of last year that US forces in Afghanistan would be drawn down from 2011 onwards following a surge in 2010. This was followed by the London Conference in January this year which called for a fast transition from the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) to the Afghan Security Forces (ASF).
Despite loud protestations to the contrary, it has become clear that the West is eager to find a face-saving formula to wash its hands off the Afghan imbroglio. According to informed sources, it took all the efforts of President Karzai and some concerned countries to ensure that red lines for accepting the Taliban into the political process were drawn within the London transition plan. Swirling around the official positions was talk of negotiating with the ‘good’ Taliban to integrate them into Afghan government structures, plans for which are to be presented by President Karzai.
In the event, the Taliban have just to shelve their current fighting mode and bide their time as apparently willing participants in the political process, striking after the withdrawal scenario unfolds. The question is whether the Afghan Government has the military and economic wherewithal to withstand the onslaught. And if not, what are the consequences for India?
It is clear that the Afghan economy will not in the foreseeable future be able to generate the resources needed to finance its security, much less the economic development necessary to address the root causes of extremism. On paper, Afghan GDP has grown well in the last decade except for a drastic drop in 2008. But it still remains at low levels and key indicators present a dismal picture.
Basically, Afghanistan is a mountainous country with scarce agricultural land subjected to the vagaries of harsh climatic conditions. Moreover, the population growth rate (3.45 per cent per year from 2005 to 2010) is the highest in South Asia, with a pronounced share of youth. These combine to produce an unstable mixture. The large informal economy, dominated by poppy cultivation and trade, is in any case beyond the government net. Domestic revenues cover only two-thirds of the government's operating expenditure, and a third of its development expenditure. This does not include the cost of security being provided by US forces and the ISAF.
The Afghan security apparatus will put greater strain on national resources if it is to reach the size required to cope with the post-withdrawal situation. Presently, it cannot prevent terrorist attacks in Kabul, let alone control many of the outlying provinces. Such a scenario spells serious trouble for India. It is not so much that a Pakistan-backed Taliban regime in Kabul will give Pakistan strategic depth in the event of a military conflict with India, as touted by some Pakistani strategists. But it will increase its tactical depth in the proxy war.
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What must India do to prepare for such a contingency? Firstly, the time has come for India to redouble its efforts, short of a military presence in Afghanistan, to strengthen the security capabilities of the Afghan government through financing, training and equipping the Afghan army and police, especially counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics formations.
| AFGHANISTAN: KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS | |||||||
| 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | |
| Growth rate of GDP (% per year) | 15.1 | 8.0 | 16.1 | 8.2 | 12.1 | 3.4 | 15.1 |
| Gross Domestic Product per capita, current prices ($) | 186.3 | 218.1 | 252.6 | 289.3 | 354.9 | 419.1 | 486.1 |
| Trade balance ($ mn) | -2486 | -3443 | -4335 | -4933 | -6002 | -6607 | -6971 |
| Central government revenues (% of GDP) | 11.4 | 12.7 | 17.6 | 16.8 | 18.1 | 15.7 | 19.9 |
| Central government expenditures (% of GDP) | 14.5 | 13.9 | 16.6 | 19.6 | 19.9 | 19.4 | 22.1 |
| Sources: (i) Asian Development Outlook (ADO) 2010, 2009 & 2008; (ii) World Economic Outlook Database, IMF | |||||||
Secondly, apart from substantially increasing its $1.3 billion economic and technical assistance pledges, it must enable Afghanistan to generate substantial revenues of its own. This might include encouraging Afghan exports. India has already signed a Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) with Afghanistan, tariff concessions under which have helped raise Afghan exports to India seven-fold since 2002, largely on account of fresh and dry fruit. The development of rich Afghan natural resources of copper, berillium, gold and semi-precious stones will enhance its export earnings.
However, for Afghanistan’s export potential to be fully realised, it is essential that the alternative route through Chahbahar port in Iran to the Indian Zaranj-Delaram road should be developed as a major trade route in cooperation with Iran.
In the longer term, Afghanistan should be enabled to earn revenues from transit trade, taking advantage of its strategic location between Central and South Asia and Iran. Although presently beset by security problems, a visionary project could be the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline between Central Asia and India. Another is the CASA-1000 Project for wheeling hydropower from Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic to an energy-hungry South Asia.
Thirdly, it must be recognised that India’s aid, though substantial, cannot be taken to levels which will make a critical difference. Unless the international community can enhance its assistance to Afghanistan in the coming years, especially post-withdrawal, all their efforts will be brought to naught. An amount of $25 billion has been pledged by donors for the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) for 2008-13, as against a total requirement of $43 billion. The London Conference added a meagre $140 million. India must therefore play a pro-active role in strengthening the international will to continue assistance.
Santosh Kumar is a retired diplomat and currently senior consultant, and Neha Malik research assistant at ICRIER