<b>Shahid Javed Burki:</b> The states of the Spring

We now know what the new dispensations across the Muslim world will look like

New political orders have begun to take shape in several Muslim countries. But the progress has been uneven. Many had hoped, and some had expected, that transforming the political systems in the Arab world following the Arab Spring would proceed smoothly. That is not happening.

By now four long-established regimes have fallen under pressure from the street; however, only in one country has the new political order begun to emerge in an orderly manner, and without shedding of additional blood. In Tunisia, elections were held that gave the largest number of seats in the Assembly to a party that has strong Islamic links. The Assembly will have the responsibility to draft a new constitution. Its offer to work with some secular parties was accepted, and a coalition government has taken office to oversee the process of constitution-making. There is hope that in about a year’s time, the Tunisian political structure would have been remade — and a new political order that represents the will of the people will be in place.

The new order will differ in several ways from the one that was discarded. It will draw its power from the people; it will not be dynastic; and it will not accept the West’s strategic interest as its default position. In terms of ideology, it will have a dose of what are seen as Islamic principles of governance — interpreted more in social and economic terms than in terms of law and politics. There is likely to be greater concern for reaching out to the poor and the disadvantaged, instead of allowing a narrow elite to capture most of the benefits of growth, as had happened in the past.

Egypt was the second country in which a long-serving autocratic ruler decided to leave office under pressure from protesters. President Hosni Mubarak was replaced by a military council that initially seemed to satisfy the street. The council promised to transfer power to elected representatives. But the military is finding it difficult to withdraw to the barracks, and leave governance in the hands of the elected people. The slow pace at which it was moving created the impression that it wanted to retain a large slice of power.

Also, the electoral system it has given the country is bound to produce a fractured Assembly that will have the responsibility of writing another constitution. It was assumed that the Assembly would produce a presidential system, but the military seemed to be in no hurry to get a new president installed. The street, having become suspicious of the military’s intentions, erupted once again. Protesters assembled once more in the famed Tahrir Square to put pressure on the new governing elite. It, in turn, seems to be pulling back, if haltingly. It may also be giving up its attempt to stay a player even in the new system.

Elections to the Constituent Assembly will be held in three phases. The once-dreaded, but now considerably chastened, Muslim Brotherhood will have a prominent presence in the new Assembly. Once it has completed its task, the system it will put in place is likely to resemble the one that is being erected in Tunisia. This, too, will be less pro-West, not dynastic, and more responsive to what people want. It, too, will want better distribution of the fruits of economic growth.

Pakistan is the third country that is coming under pressure from the street to change. It has been subjected to what some analysts call “jalsa politics”: Imran Khan, the rising star of Pakistani politics, has addressed one large jalsa (public meeting) in Lahore and several smaller ones in other parts of the country. His bandwagon has begun to roll, attracting many new riders; Shah Mahmood Qureshi quit the administration of President Asif Ali Zardari to throw in his lot with Khan. Khan’s rapid rise as Pakistan politics’ third force was prompted by some of the same considerations that prompted several regime changes in the Muslim world. He has tapped into growing anti-American sentiment in the country, growing anger at the sharp widening of the income and wealth gaps, and spreading disgust at widespread corruption. Khan and his associates have used the same technology that made it possible for the youth in Tunisia and Egypt to assemble in public places and to spread their message. If he wins power, the government he will lead will have the same leanings as those that are likely to take office in some countries of the Arab world.

It is, therefore, not a stretch to argue that the tsunami generated by the earthquake in the Arab world has reached the shores of the non-Arab Muslim world. This has happened since the followers of the Islamic faith have struggled to find a way to accommodate their religion in the make-up of modern states in Muslim countries. This revolution was led by young people who, while being comfortable with modernity, were keen not to give up their religious beliefs. At the same time, they were keen to define strategic interests that were in line with their own objectives and not those of the West. The state that is likely to emerge in the Muslim world will be very differently constituted from those that held power for almost 100 years — since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early years of the 20th century.

The author is a former finance minister of Pakistan