The Arab Spring, launched in the winter of 2010-11, is now more than a year old. It has felled four governments and threatened several others. It has made some progress in creating a new political order in a part of the world that was dominated by autocrats. Strongmen were able to keep themselves in power because of the support they received from their military (Egypt and Tunisia) or because of the clan rivalries in their highly fractured societies (Libya and Yemen). Now that the process of bringing about political change has begun in some of these countries, a number of issues will have to be resolved before durable and fully representative political structures can be built. One of the most important unresolved issues is the demilitarisation of Muslim politics.
The Islamic world has a long history of the military’s deep involvement in political affairs. This can be traced back to the founding of the Islamic state at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and to its expansion under the caliphs who succeeded the prophet, until the founding of the Ottoman Empire. It was under Turkish rule that a political order was created in which the military provided the muscle that kept the rulers in power. The fall of the Ottomans brought European colonialism to the Muslim lands; it also relied on military prowess to control the conquered territories. The end of the colonial period, following the weakening of Europe after World War II, created a number of independent states in the Muslim world. But political development did not come with independence; the military returned to power in some form or another.
This brings me to an important question: will the military in various parts of the Muslim world allow the establishment of political order demanded by those who risked a great deal to dethrone the old system? The answer is yes. But at the same time, it has to be recognised that the process will take time. There are three paths that are being travelled in three different parts of the Muslim world: in Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. Each will be different, but each will influence the paths followed by the other two.
Turkey has gone the furthest in this context. There are three features in the Turkish experience that can guide the evolving democracies in other parts of the Muslim world. First, representative political institutions – parliaments and political parties – can only exert pressure on the armed forces to pull back from the political space once they have demonstrated their ability to govern fairly, efficiently and effectively. It is only after winning three successive elections as head of AKP, the political party that recognises that Islam has a role in shaping a society, that Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan was able to put pressure on an assertive military establishment to leave politics to politicians.
Second, political success in a rapidly changing situation needs economic stability for the process to move forward. Turkey is now one of the fastest-growing countries in the world — this is mostly the consequence of the intelligent policies pursued by the Erdogan government.
Third, strong institutions and a working legal system create a sense of confidence that the military is not needed to provide a society with backup support whenever crises arrive. It was the inability of the civilian leadership to deal with difficulties – often economic in nature – that brought the military into politics. This happened in Turkey and more frequently in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s political evolution has been hampered by the very poor quality of its governance. The system has not produced the kind of confidence in civilian leadership that has propelled the Turkish system towards total civilian control. The country is now faced with the kind of crisis that brought the military to power on four different occasions over the last 54 years — in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999. What has stopped the military from being tempted into taking political command once again is the growing strength of civil society institutions and an independent and assertive judiciary. However, civilian control over the military has not advanced to the point where the men in uniform can be kept out of the corridors of power. That said, it is clear to the military establishment that any effort to subvert the political system would be resisted by the people and the judiciary.
It is precisely what has kept Pakistan’s fledgling democratic system in play and the military at bay that is being challenged in Egypt. The current military-dominated establishment that is overseeing the process of political development seems determined to keep out of the country foreign influences that are helping to build a robust civil society. Non-governmental organisations can serve the people while the institutions that can ensure popular representation are still at the formative stage.
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This is why some US-based institutions such as Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute are being harassed by Egypt’s government-in-transition. But, as Thomas L Friedman wrote in a recent column for The New York Times with reference to Fayza Abul Naga, minister in charge of planning and international co-operation, this is “her last dance. It is elements of the old regime playing the last cards they have to both undermine the true democratic forces in Egypt and to save themselves by posing as protectors of Egypt’s honour”.
The way political development is proceeding in these three large Muslim countries makes it clear that the military is being factored out of politics. The pace at which this will happen depends on how fast alternative institutions are developed to give voice to the people. In Turkey, this is happening in the formal political space; in Pakistan this function is being provided by civil society and the judiciary. Egypt will need to go the Pakistan way before it reaches the place where Turkey has already arrived.
The writer is a former finance minister of Pakistan