Is there a political way out of the military stalemate in Afghanistan? From local power brokers to regional commanders, national leaders and the international community, everyone is engaged through multiple levels of back channel diplomacy to find a way forward in this strife-torn nation. Some claim, albeit privately, a modicum of progress in talks with the Taliban.
At the same time, however, preliminary results of the recently concluded parliamentary elections are raising the spectre of ethnic polarisation and fragmentation in an already highly politicised environment in Kabul.
These impressions came through discussions and street narratives, in Kabul and outside, during my recent visit there. The Afghan people are unsure of the direction in which their country is heading. Three trends are visible from the September 18 elections. First, in the absence of political parties, individual candidates contested the polls on the strength of their money power. Second, some candidates’ ability to tinker with the voting process gave them an edge over rivals, sparking allegations of fraud and rigging. In the south, the security situation did not permit Pushtun voters to exercise their rights. Third, against perceptions of the waning ‘staying power’ of western nations in Afghanistan, the involvement of regional powers in the internal power play is becoming clearer by the day.
The increased political space the ethnic Hazaras have carved out for themselves in the elections, with 48 MPs in the parliament — an increase of 22 seats from last time — can lead to an ethnic reconfiguration of a greater Pashtun-Hazara alliance versus the Panjsheris. The Iranian involvement in Afghanistan’s political process and support to the Hazaras cannot be discounted. Ghazni province returned all 11 Hazara candidates who contested. Likewise, reports of cash bags given by the Iranians to the President’s office have been acknowledged by the Afghan President himself.
Afghanistan’s tragedy lies in the fact that its internal contradictions time and again get caught up in external power agendas. The regional powers are yet again actively supporting their proxies. While support to various candidates on ethnic lines remains prominent, the lure to engage the largest ethnic group — the Pushtuns — as a way to break into the rank and file of the Taliban insurgency has gained momentum.
President Hamid Karzai’s overtures towards the Taliban and various attempts at negotiations with the insurgents are plain examples of his attempt to seek a return of the Taliban to Kabul’s power politics. Karzai’s numerous attempts are, however, paralleled by the regional powers. Pakistan, Iran and China are striving for a predominant role in the future power sharing arrangement in Afghanistan.
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Though Karzai’s attempts at reconciliation have been seen as signs of desperation, the weakened leader is also trying to retain power through ‘negotiating and bargaining’ politics, typical of the Afghan political psyche. President Karzai is seeking to manoeuvre his way within the recently established High Peace Council (HPC), which is the product of an accelerated peace-building process and which was set up by him after the peace jirga in June. Of the 70 HPC members, 53 either belong to or are currently linked to armed factions involved in the civil wars of the 1980-90s. Twelve members held positions in the Taliban government between 1996 and 2001.
A counter-force to the Taliban is the predominance of other ethnic groups and the appointment of Ustad Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, as the chairman of the HPC. At the same time, Masoom Stanakzai, the chief coordinator-cum-liaison officer (Dar-ul Insha), and the three deputies are Pushtuns. This composition of the HPC could provide Karzai leverage for delicately balancing ethnic power equations in Afghanistan. In any event, very few expect the HPC to emerge as a real brainstorming forum with a possible impact on the direction of peace building. The ‘real’ negotiations, in all probability, will be conducted by a three-member coterie led by Ahmad Wali Karzai.
The location of the Taliban leadership, the Quetta Shura, has given Pakistan a strong position in the negotiation process. The Quetta Shura is a bargaining chip which Pakistan’s spy agency, the ISI, will continue to use to gain more American funds and to influence the future power dispensation. Karzai’s earlier attempt at establishing direct contacts with the Afghan Taliban’s second-in-command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was thwarted by the Pakistani ISI, which ensured Baradar’s arrest in Karachi in February.
Conversations with Afghan officials reveal that the ISI picked up Baradar to halt peace talks that excluded Islamabad and could have possibly led to a diminished Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. Only after Karzai agreed to formally recognise Pakistan’s role in the future peace process with the Taliban was Baradar released from Pakistani custody. In the coming days, Baradar will probably travel into Afghanistan and play a key role in facilitating talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Gen David Petraeus, commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, has disclosed that Taliban figures had been granted safe passage to talks in Afghanistan.
Other regional powers have not been far behind in finding their own ways of wheeler-dealing with various strands of the Taliban insurgency. Iran’s financial largesse has not only benefited the Afghan government but also various segments of the Taliban insurgency. The western media alleges that five Iranian companies in Afghanistan’s capital are using their offices covertly to finance Taliban militants in provinces near Kabul. In light of the difficult US-Iranian relationship, Iran does not want to be far behind in shaping the political future of its strategic neighbour, with which it shares a 936-km-long border.
China too is seen to have opened back channel negotiations with the Taliban. Likewise, there are increasing signs of Russian involvement in equipping the Afghan national army and air force. While India has not officially endorsed the talks, there has been a proactive effort at engaging the Pushtuns as a bulwark against the spread of the Pakistan Taliban and associated groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, who are now finding a base inside Afghanistan.
A regional solution is increasingly being propagated to address Afghanistan’s woes. The countries in the region need to play a stabilising role in Afghanistan, even in a scenario where the US persists with its irresolution in Afghanistan beyond the June 2011 withdrawal date. However, there is little hope at the moment that the competing and conflicting interests of the regional powers will contribute in any positive manner to the long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan.
The author is visiting research fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore and associate fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, Delhi