Slow dance with China

Any visit by a Chinese president is important in and of itself, even if it seems to produce little forward movement on key issues. President Hu Jintao's four-day Indian sojourn has not produced any breakthroughs, leading to understandably tepid media coverage, but the two largest countries in Asia have to engage with each other, and frequent summit-level meetings are therefore to be encouraged. To be sure, India has reason to be wary of Chinese intentions and actions: the border dispute makes little progress towards a settlement, China is certainly trying to encircle India with an aggressive posture (the so-called "string of pearls" strategy), and its relationship with Pakistan remains one that is in important ways directed at India. But to see China purely as a threat would be to indulge in a self-fulfilling prophecy; the world's second-largest economy and India's largest neighbour also presents important opportunities.

One that has been missed during Mr Hu's visit is the chance to set an ambitious trade target. The goal of doubling bilateral trade in four years' time translates into annual growth of about 20 per cent, which is less than the growth rate of India's total external trade in recent years. It should be remembered that even the last bilateral trade target was set too low, and was reached two or three years ahead of schedule. History may now repeat itself.

The backdrop to the visit was provided by the needlessly provocative comments on Arunachal Pradesh, made by the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi, and this may have caused some frigidity between the two leaders. But India has not covered itself with glory by treating Chinese companies as touch-me-nots. On the border issue, China of course has not budged from the deal it offered nearly half a century ago, nor has India created the domestic public opinion that will facilitate any concessions. Hence the prolonged stalemate. On the nuclear issue, China says that it will not stand in India's way, which means that it will not make a fuss within the Nuclear Suppliers' Group when it comes to discussing the flow of nuclear goods and technology to India, but China has already revealed its intention to do bilateral nuclear deals with Pakistan and Bangladesh. So the signals are clear: no confrontation, perhaps some cooperation, but do the real deals with India's neighbours. The room for mutual suspicion therefore remains.

Among the many agreements signed (almost Soviet-style, in an effort to show the world that the visit has been a success), a potentially important one is the setting up of a working group on river waters. India has concerns about how China intends to behave as an upper riparian, especially when it comes to the vital Brahmaputra river, and formal interaction can only be to the good""though there may be nothing to show for it for years. The other agreements are fairly minor ones, and more in the nature of an exercise in optics: the two countries will open consulates in Kolkata and Guangzhou, there will be bilateral investment promotion and protection, protection of intellectual property rights, and a road rally from Kunming to Kolkata. One intriguing agreement is a memorandum on cooperation with regard to commodity futures regulation. Another is on phyto-sanitary requirements for exporting rice from India. India and China will also see if they can open new routes to Kailash-Mansarovar. And bilateral tourism is to be encouraged, including sending 500 students to China! One hopes that Manmohan Singh and President Hu did not spend too much time on such trivialities.