Subir Roy: A new chapter for India, hopefully

VALUE FOR MONEY

The chances of an agreement between India and the US for peaceful use of nuclear energy have become brighter after the publication of the draft agreement. Many sceptics have admitted that both the governments, the Indian and the US, have taken great pains to address Indian concerns. If nothing else and irrespective of what history may hold, this seems to be an honest effort to recognise realities and take things forward for the good of India and the world as a whole. The agreement marks a remarkable shift in the official US position on India and it is the US side which will have to do a lot of explaining to its public to address old concerns. Even if this agreement does not live its full life, India will be no worse off than it would have been without attempting to have such an agreement in the first place.

The likely gains from the agreement are obvious. India will be able to substantially raise access to nuclear energy from present minimal levels. A marginal but measurable reduction of dependence on fossil fuels, which are subjected to tremendous price volatility, will enhance India's energy security. Greater use of nuclear energy will have a tremendous impact on the country's ability to rein in the sharp rise in its emission of greenhouse gases which will be inevitable as its beats poverty and pursues growth. Climate change concerns are peaking and even laggards like the US federal government and Australia are likely to fall in line and accept commitments to reduce their emission of greenhouse gasses. It is highly beneficial for India to be able to acquire a new weapon to keep in check air pollution, thereby lessening the disease burden on its people, and also cooperate with other countries in the process.

There will be another gain, hitherto largely unstated. By being able to access and work the latest nuclear power technology, Indian scientists and engineers will be able to absorb such technology in a way they would never have been able to otherwise. If, per chance, the agreement collapses at some future date and India returns all the material things received under the agreement, this knowledge will not be returned simply because it cannot be. The knowledge pool available at that juncture will be infinitely superior to what would have been the case otherwise and greatly aid independent R&D effort. In fact, such research, via knowledge transfer through osmosis, will be considerably aided even while the agreement is in force and its obligations strictly adhered to.

It is not as if the agreement is either in the bag or has no chance of collapsing in its lifetime of 40 years. First, for the agreement to come into force, India will have to arrive at a similar understanding with other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), reach a specific safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and an administrative agreement with the US to implement the agreement. The real uncertainty revolves round China and its role in the NSG. China cannot be expected to make things easy and at least token resistance ought to be anticipated. What is wide open is the attitude of other NSG members. There is some expectation that they will be softer than a US government bound by fiats from a Congress which has till now had non-proliferation high on its agenda. If this does not happen then the scenario worsens.

Assuming that these uncertainties are overcome and the agreement comes into force, its smooth working will be dependent on both the parties acting in good faith, as they have clearly promised to do in the agreement. The US, in particular, has bent over backwards to reassure India on the issue of fuel supplies in view of its past record of breaching an agreement. If despite the arrangements specified in the treaty for some reason a disruption in fuel supply does occurs (read Congress does not allow it), "the US and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries ... such as Russia, France and the UK to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supplies to India".

Such a situation can most likely happen if India breaks its own moratorium on conducting further nuclear tests. In fact, that is likely to be the only reason which can prompt the US to end the treaty, which either party can do with a year's notice. But here also the agreement seeks to recognise a situation when India may be forced to resume testing by the actions of others and the US promises some understanding. It will "take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other states which could impact national security". In other words, if Pakistan carries out a test or if China does something terribly bellicose in response to which it is rational for India to hone its nuclear capability, then the US reaction will be suitably tempered. But not if India carries out a test simply to fulfil the BJP's agenda, as it did in 1998. It is important not to minimise the international fallout of such a development, not just on the agreement but well beyond it.

The agreement acknowledges upfront that its purpose is to "is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party". The agreement will not "hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material ... and military nuclear facilities ... developed by (the Parties) independent of this agreement..." Thus the agreement has sought to acknowledge Indian sovereignty and sensitivities, on the one hand, and keep on the right side of the US Congress, on the other, while seeking to accord India a new international status.

subir.roy@bsmail.in