With the British referendum tomorrow, this first column in the new series will focus on Europe and Britain in Europe. Delhi conversations tend to be dominated by domestic matters, and that is only to be expected. But in the three weeks since my return, it has been striking how little interest there is in Europe, except perhaps in the matters of summer holidays, football and, where Britain is concerned, cricket.
This is somewhat puzzling, as the European Union (EU) remains far and away India's largest trading partner. Data for 2014 from the European Commission indicates that two-way goods trade with Europe, at Euro 75 billion, is a third more than with the US at Euro 48 billion. (Indeed, even China is a bigger trading partner with India than the US). As the EU is fundamentally a trade grouping, this ought to be the bedrock of the relationship. Both geography and history have also tied India with Europe over millennia, from Alexander the Great and Rome to the Raj.
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As Jaimini Bhagwati suggested recently in these pages ("Economic and strategic interdependence", June 16), the Indian elite remains obsessed with military security in its external dealings. In this sphere, the EU has largely outsourced its responsibilities to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the increasing chagrin and irritation of the United States. The innate caution of Germany (now clearly the leading EU power) toward the exercise of military force reinforces the unwillingness of Britain and France to surrender their foreign policy autonomy.
India's dwindling interest in Europe also reflects Europe's own drawing inward since the financial crisis of 2008. Within the euro zone this crisis has created deep economic tensions between northern (creditor) and southern (debtor) member states as well as between the 'ins' and 'outs': those committed to the survival of the euro and those, notably Britain, which want no part of it. Not soon after the euro had passed from intensive care to the general ward (in 2013) Europe was confronted by a massive influx of asylum seekers and economic migrants from its Islamic periphery, and has become aware of the radicalisation of its own Muslim population. On top of all this has been the sharp shift in Russia's security posture, particularly in Ukraine, and more recently in the Baltics.
Britain has been largely isolated from this sea of troubles: it is not part of the euro zone, and indeed its recovery from the 2008 crisis has proceeded fairly well, particularly where unemployment is concerned. It has also been distant from the latest surge of asylum seekers, other than those waiting it out in Calais trying to hitch a ride in the lorries going through the Channel tunnel. Yet, for reasons to do with the internal dynamics of the rank and file of the Conservative Party, Prime Minister David Cameron has felt obliged to put the issue of Britain's continuation in the EU to a referendum.
Based on the British press it seems that a series of tactical miscalculations have made the outcome much less certain than the government had hoped. Within Britain an increasingly polarised debate has now largely revolved around two issues: the economic impact of leaving the EU (Brexit as it has been termed) and the impact on overall net immigration into the UK, since Britain is obligated to permit free movement of labour from other member states. A nation consumed by a bitter and divisive debate has been shocked by the murder of a young, much-liked Member of Parliament. While not directly linked to the referendum, there is a sense that the rancour in British society may have been a contributing factor.
The outcome of the referendum is also of deep concern to Britain's EU partners. Unlike membership of the euro, where there is no explicit provision for leaving the club, there is formal provision for a member state to negotiate exit, and this is what Parliament would presumably instruct the prime minister of the day to initiate in the event of a 'Leave' victory. This would not be entirely unprecedented: Greenland chose to leave the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union, in 1985. There is concern that a precedent set by Britain might be attractive to other member states; certainly anti-Brussels sentiment is as strong or stronger in other large countries such as France.
If financial markets are anything to go by, there is a sense that the 'Leave' campaign has recently lost momentum, and that Britons will vote 'Remain'. If I had the vote, that would be my choice as well, so it is possible that I am guilty of wishful thinking. That said, I cannot help feeling that the 'Remain' campaign has somewhat exaggerated the long-run economic impact of Brexit. Prima facie it seems surprising that moving out of a customs union should be so damaging, particularly when tariff levels are relatively low.
So for me the main concerns around Brexit are, and have to be, political. It is these that should also be of diplomatic interest to India. There is no question that Europe has been through a tough decade and has made many mistakes along the way. It is also undeniable that the poorly defined and shifting boundary between national and supranational jurisdictions makes it an awkward and often self-righteous counterpart to deal with. Yet for all its faults, a cohesive Europe provides a more credible counterweight to the dominance of the US and China than individual countries could, given their size. For this reason India should wish for its survival and success.