This divergence between my own instincts and the new international consensus on India has led me to reflect on the underlying sources of my conviction. In this reassessment, I find myself returning to tools of understanding to which I have been exposed as a member of Shell's global scenarios team. Early in 2013, Shell released the latest of its periodic scenarios. Titled the "New Lens Scenarios" (www.shell.com/scenarios) , they examine current trends in global society and technology, in order to frame two plausible, if extreme, visions of the global order over the next 30 years. From these visions (labelled "mountains" and "oceans"), the scenarios extract different trajectories for global primary energy supply and for global greenhouse gas emissions. In arriving at these visions (or "panoramas", as they are called in the document) use is made of "transition lenses" (or ways in which complex systems respond to stress). These lenses are primarily applied to nations, but can be applied to other complex entities, such as large corporations.
Despite the fall of the Berlin Wall and the United States' "war on terror", the world enjoyed a period of comparative global stability and continuity from roughly the mid-1980s till the mid-2000s. In the economic sphere, this era has been christened the "Great Moderation" - a period of steady, non-inflationary growth in the rich countries. The global financial crisis signalled an end to this era, while also illuminating deeper stresses that had accumulated in the same period. These stressors include the connectivity revolution; the build-up of debt; the rise in income inequality in most large economies (even as global inequality diminished); and the shift of economic activity from the north Atlantic to the rim of the Pacific led by China's explosive growth.
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The scale and simultaneity of these developments impose significant pressure on decision making at the global, national and the corporate level. Such complex systems can react in two broad ways to these stresses. Those that have "room for manoeuvre" are able to deploy political and economic resources to fend off challenges to the status quo and are able to return to their former state, or established path of motion. An example is the response of the US authorities to the financial crisis. The US had sufficient political, financial and intellectual resources to recapitalise and restructure the system, despite massive redistributive implications, in the interests of the larger good. Closer to home, one could say the same about the response of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA-I) government to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Despite being near the end of its term, that government mobilised its policy and political resources to mount an impressive defence.
The opposite situation arises if there is deadlock among opposing forces and constituencies. Such deadlock usually arises from an inability to handle the distributional consequences of change. Such a context is described as a "trapped transition". Stresses build up, ultimately leading to collapse of the old order, in a process called "reset and write-off". This is the fate of decaying empires - Roman, Ottoman and Soviet. It should be stressed that "room for manoeuvre" and "trapped transition" are descriptive rather than predictive classifications, which is why in the scenarios they are called "transition lenses". They are essentially exercises in pattern recognition and classification, but can also be useful as a diagnostic tool.
This brings us to India's current condition. Using the above terminology, much foreign commentary would characterise India as being stuck in a trapped transition. In support of this diagnosis, such writers typically include a political system dominated by money power, corruption and strong vested interests; a bureaucracy consumed by its own rights and privileges; and a corporate sector more concerned with rent-seeking than innovation. While this may be an accurate description of where we are today, the more interesting question is whether the society demonstrates sufficient resilience to generate antibodies to these pathologies. Again to borrow imagery from the Shell scenarios, do these powerful currents generate their own counter-currents?
Political events over the last few weeks provide some basis for cheer. While perhaps not of transcendental significance, the success of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in the Delhi state elections acts as a shot across the bow for the two national parties, indicating that political insurgency can be a spoiler and can reframe the terms of the debate. Markers of this impact include the passage of the lok pal Bill, the confusion of the two national parties as to what stance to take on the formation of the state government in Delhi, and the clear shift in tone in the remarks of the vice-president of the Congress party, Rahul Gandhi, before industrial leaders in Delhi.
Two swallows do not make a spring, but neither should this be seen as the winter of our discontent. For me, these developments provide additional support to a long-held view of mine that, despite its venality, apparent insensitivity and distressing raucousness, India is fundamentally a resilient, pragmatic, problem-solving polity. It needs time to address the big issues, but in time solve them - often through unexpected means. The classic example is independence itself, when India showed the world the way to decolonisation. There are other examples too, such as the integration of the princely states into the body politic or the defeat of famine by the green revolution.
This is not to counsel complacency. India remains a much poorer country than it need be, and it faces enormous challenges ahead. But greater political accountability is surely going to be part of the solution. The path will be long and tortuous, but viewing the situation through scenario lenses, there is some reason to feel that we are on the right track.
The writer is group chief economist, Shell International. Views are personal