Sunanda K Datta Ray: Lessons for peace

WHERE MONEY TALKS

As the old saying goes, 'tis an ill wind that blows nobody any good. That might apply to the wrath of wind and wave which has killed thousands of people in 12 countries, impoverished thousands others and devastated vast areas.

But out of the pain and suffering might yet emerge a message of reconciliation if only the governments of two of the worst affected countries "" Sri Lanka and Indonesia "" seize the opportunity that nature has thrust at them.

It is for President Chandrika Kumaratunge in Colombo and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Jakarta to respond with courage and imagination to not-so-hidden urges among the rebels in Jaffna and Aceh.

The Indian high commissioner's visit to ravaged areas of northeast Sri Lanka may be significant in this context.

Not because India has a direct role to play in the struggle for Tamil Eeelam, but because Manatkadu and Kudathanai, which Ms Nirupama Sen visited, are in the heart of territory controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam who have detested the Indian government for many years. India, in turn, banned the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.

But Ms Sen was allowed to hand over six lorryloads of relief material for tsunami victims which suggests that there is something in the phrase "disaster detente".

Suffering does not wipe out sharp political differences; but alleviation of suffering emphasises that a common humanity binds even adversaries.

It is precisely because of nature's savagery that the leaders of the LTTE, as well as of the equally notorious Free Aceh Movement or GAM, were quick to hold out what looks hopefully like olive branches.

So far, however, the official reaction in both countries has invited more criticism than praise, creating the bizarre impression that Asia's most desperate insurgents are more anxious for peace and the resolution of old quarrels than democratically elected governments.

Sri Lanka's refusal to allow the United Nations secretary-general, Kofi Annan, to tour the stricken Tamil north was one regrettable setback. Another was the restriction Indonesia announced for foreign troops and relief workers in suffering Aceh.

The Indonesian defence minister's subsequent backtracking appears to apply only to foreign troops like French military doctors; he will have to extend the same concession to foreign aid workers if Aceh secessionists are to be convinced that they are not being discriminated against even in distress.

Yet, it started out well with GAM's self-styled "prime minister", Malik Mehmoud, announcing from his Swedish exile that the movement "has ordered its armed forces to observe a unilateral cease-fire."

He did add warningly, however, that they would "only fight if attacked". The LTTE did not need to make a similar promise since it was already bound by the Norwegian-brokered cease-fire of February 2002. But its chief, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, struck a conciliatory note, sending condolences "in deep sorrow...to our Muslim and Sinhala brethren in the southern coastal areas who have lost their kith and kin". It was noteworthy since most Muslims and every single Sinhalese, man, woman and child, oppose the Eelam demand.

Sadly, those opening salvos were not followed up. Both groups complain of discriminatory distribution of help. Even Jan Egeland, the UN relief coordinator, observed that relief workers "were able to reach out in all of the affected countries except in Sumatra and Aceh".

Foreign workers like Paul Barber of the British-based human rights organisation, Tapol, noted that there had been no reduction "in the level of military operations". On the contrary, 15,000 troops were rushed to join the 40,000 already in Aceh.

True, troops are not deployed only to fight. The military alone can discharge many rescue, relief and rehabilitation functions. But the history and reputation of Indonesia's armed forces, reinforced by well documented excesses in East Timor, argue for extra care.

Having lost men and infrastructure to the tsunami, GAM rebels may be on the defensive. Reports of the army organising Aceh's Javanese minority into vigilante groups can only add to unease by threatening them with civil war.

The Aceh war has cost some 10,000, mainly civilian, lives. The struggle for Eeelam has taken toll of more than 64,000. Despite suspicions of West Asian funding for GAM and of Jemaah Islamiyah involvement in Aceh, the LTTE is militarily more dangerous.

Sri Lanka's geography allows it to influence the central government more decisively than GAM in Indonesia. Its streamlined publicity machine recently produced two propaganda CDs of pictures, words and music.

Only in November, Prabhakaran threatened to break the cease-fire, claiming after a 19-month deadlock that he had "reached the limits of patience". The tsunami averted this catastrophe. Now, the LTTE expects its professional handling of relief to impress the world that it can run a government.

Meanwhile, Aceh, where a civil emergency last year replaced the martial law imposed in May 2003, can slip back into conflict if the authorities succumb to fears of the rebels using a lull to regroup or seize the propaganda advantage.

The secular contribution of radical volunteers deserves encouragement even if their camps flaunt fundamentalist slogans like "Islamic Law Enforcement".

Alwi Shihab, who holds the people's welfare portfolio in Jakarta, described the crisis as "a unique opportunity for the Indonesian government to solve issues in Aceh and begin the peace process, and to solve problems with radicals as well".

That also applies to Sri Lanka. Official nervousness or military recklessness should not be allowed to arrest the momentum of peace in either country.