The Beijing question

Even as Donald Trump prepares to meet his counterpart from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Xi Jinping, the attention of most Americans is focused on Trump’s real opponents: The 20 or so politicians seeking the nomination of the Democratic party for president of the United States. There were so many of them that the debates are being staggered — half of them debated each other on Wednesday night, and the other half on Thursday. 

Trump, typically, declared early on that the first debate was “BORING!”, and we cannot assume he was paying attention, even though he might have learned something useful. But the real question is whether Xi was listening. Because it came through in the debate that, even if Trump’s methods are questionable, his reorientation of the US foreign policy towards Beijing may well be permanent. 

When asked about how he would deal with the PRC, for example, the young Democratic from Indian, Pete Buttigieg, declared that “their authoritarian model is being held up as an alternative to ours because ours looks so chaotic”, but that the severity of the challenge from Beijing should not be underestimated or minimised by the Democrats. “They’re using technology for the perfection of dictatorship,” he said. Another Democrat warned of what he called “Chinese malfeasance in the trade relationship”. Yet another accused them of “cheating”. 

Fortunately for Xi, the only Democrat who looks soft on Beijing is also the one who has — at the moment — a comfortable lead in opinion polls. Joe Biden, who has been part of the establishment forever, is a paid-up member of the older bloc of Democrats who first saw the PRC through a Cold War prism and then through the ultimately deceptive lens of “engagement” leading to democracy and rule of law. Biden controversially said at a recent rally that “You know, they’re not bad folks... but, guess what, they’re not competition for us”. The Republicans are prepared to make Biden’s stand on Beijing an issue — armed in particular with an accusation that the then vice president’s son, Hunter Biden, flew on Air Force Two with his father to Beijing in December 2013 and then became professionally involved with a firm seeking to raise $1.5 billion from state-connected lenders in the PRC.
 

So intense was the response, however, to Biden’s remarks that he had to walk them back a bit, admitting that the PRC was “a problem”. And even if he himself appears to be relatively unconvinced of the threat, there is every likelihood that, if he elected, whichever Democrat he picks as Secretary of State will carry out what appears to be the new Washington consensus. Many there disagree with Trump’s approach — trade wars are expensive, and painful, and often unproductive. But an attempt to isolate Beijing on trade, on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), technology transfer, freedom of navigation and other similar issues is extremely likely to continue under a Democratic administration. 

India needs to adjust to this reality. The time for “balance” is running out. When the current US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, visited New Delhi this week he stood next to Foreign Minister S Jaishankar and declared that the BRI came not just with strings attached but with “shackles”. (Beijing officials declared that Pompeo was “under a spell or something” because he kept “slandering” the BRI. The Global Times, with its usual calm restraint, said that Pompeo’s attitude was “phenomenally abominable”.) The Trump administration has not yet figured out, unfortunately, that gaining ground against Beijing would require it to be nicer to other powers — too much effort has been expended undermining the US-India relationship of late, with trade issues being raised from “irritants” to “obstacles” over the past year. But New Delhi, too, has been nothing if not short-sighted. It needs to not just get the US on-side but to stop imagining that the PRC will behave like any other, docile developing country. Why, for example, did the Union commerce ministry include an envoy from the PRC in discussions on how to fix the multilateral trading system recently? Given the actual problems that are destabilising the trading system emerge essentially from the economic system of the PRC, that seemed a patently illogical decision. 

Even if the Osaka G-20 summit ends with some sort of apparent rapprochement between Xi and Trump, there is no reason to suppose it will last. Both leaders are responding now to strong domestic pressures that have boxed them into a confrontational attitude. And even if Trump leaves the Oval Office in 2021, his Democratic successor may change the method by which this confrontation is carried on, but cannot alter its momentum. India prides itself on its “strategic autonomy”, but there will come a time, soon, when it should pick a side. 

Email: m.s.sharma@gmail.com; Twitter: @mihirssharma