The Blackberry muddle

The government wants to intercept e-mails on mobiles in the interest of the country's security. The intention seems to be good, but only on paper. For, a blanket power to intercept emails will probably end up diluting the legal validity of encrypted communication in an age when privacy is of utmost importance to companies as well as individuals. The case revolves around the highly popular BlackBerry brand of mobiles, owned by Canadian communications major Research In Motion (RIM), which has an estimated 400,000 subscribers in India and is expected to have around 14 million subscribers around the globe by March-end.

The Centre had issued a notice, directing BlackBerry service providers (Airtel, Vodafone, Reliance Communications and BPL) to stop services by December 31, 2007. It later extended the deadline to March end. The ministry had cited security concerns as it could not monitor the content on RIM's servers, which were located in Canada and other foreign locations. The matter came to light when the media recently asked the Tata Teleservices management why it had not thought of launching BlackBerry services.

Encryption is the process of converting information into a form that is unintelligible to anyone except the holders of a specific cryptographic key (the intended recipient). It is particularly important in an age when India has around 230 million mobiles (with 6-7 million being added every month); when payments are being made using mobiles; and when mobile banking is on the threshold of being introduced. Moreover, official emails, which comprise a majority of BlackBerrry emails (since most are enterprise users), contain highly sensitive matter. In RIM's case, though, decryption is not possible without RIM's consent which is why the government is fuming. Some technology experts note that if the email originates from India, it can be intercepted at the wireless service provider's end, since the nodes are in India. The problem arises if the email originates from a BlackBerry device (since it goes to a server outside India where it gets encrypted). Even then, monitoring every mail that emanates out of a server not in India will be ridiculous. All email services with servers in foreign lands will have to be shut down.

To be fair, with the increasing terrorist threats, India's concern may not be unique. The United States, for instance, has always had the reputation of not allowing any email service provider to operate without it being able to break the encrypted code. In this context, the Indian government could be firm, asking RIM (or any other player) to take action on a specific case that arouses suspicion. It may not be practical to ban the services altogether.