The “launch” of the first Indian-built nuclear submarine marks the beginning of a new phase for India’s navy. Not because of what everyone has commented on—namely, the fact that the country has joined a global club of (so far) five countries, because that can be said to be true only when the Arihant and its nuclear arsenal become operational, in a couple of years—but because it signals the effort that is under way to build the country’s submarine fleet (and indeed the entire Indian Navy) after a hiatus of a couple of decades. India’s submarine fleet today is smaller than it was 15 or 20 years ago, in large part because the programme to build HDW submarines at Mazagon Docks was scrapped in the wake of a bribery scandal that surfaced in the early 1980s; this was the first of several episodes in the last quarter century when a pay-off scandal derailed an armaments acquisition programme. India’s surface fleet too is no bigger than it was 30 or 35 years ago, though boat-for-boat the fighting capacity has improved. Now, the programme to build 10 stealth frigates promises to change that picture, helped also by the planned acquisition of some boats from Russia (including a controversial aircraft carrier). Navies take decades to build, so it may be 2020 before India’s naval fighting capacity is significantly enhanced. The good news is that the task has begun.
Progress has been slow because the country is on a learning curve (the Arihant has taken more than a quarter century to build), and because of limited production capacity. Now, for the first time, there are two fully booked production enterprises, Mazagon Docks and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers. In addition, Cochin Shipyard is building an indigenous aircraft carrier whose keel was laid in February, with two more to follow. For good measure, private enterprises like Larsen & Toubro have increased their capabilities, and have contributed to the overall effort. The positive aspect of the building of naval fighting capability is the extent to which the ship acquisition programme has been indigenised; this has been possible because the navy has worked closely with manufacturers in a way that has not been in evidence when it comes to either the air force or the army.
The good news has come along with reports last week of the Comptroller and Auditor General slamming the navy for going in for an old aircraft carrier that will cost more than a new one. It is no secret that the Russians have raised the price of the Gorshkov quite substantially, more than once, causing much heartburn in the defence ministry. But India has persisted with the deal, presumably for strategic reasons. The CAG report should be carefully studied to see whether the contract could have been handled differently. Other lessons from the experience should also be built into institutional memory so that the experience is not repeated. It is also possible that the full story has not come out, in that the price has gone up in part because the navy has asked for more hardware and software to be loaded onto the ship.