An eruption of anger and frustration has greeted the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Chief Electoral Officer's announcement that the revision of electoral rolls was likely to add approximately 2.5 million new voters in the Union Territory. Why was this not taken as a perfectly 'normal' course of action in J&K?
Probably because among electors who have come of age, the revised electoral rolls would also include "outsiders" ordinarily resident in J&K, security and armed forces personnel posted at a "peace station" like Jammu (as opposed to disturbed areas in the Kashmir Valley); and migrant Kashmiri Pandits who can register as voters in their home constituencies from wherever they are.
To understand the impotent anger of the ordinary Kashmiri, one has to recognise that they see the measures now unfolding as a consequence of the Centre's new Kashmir policy implemented on August 5, 2019. The political parties of J&K have criticised them for "allowing non-locals to vote".
The J&K government issued a "clarification to assuage public anger" that the figure of 2.5 million new voters, given out by the Chief Electoral Officer, was mainly due to the new voters who have attained 18 years of age on or before October 1, 2022. Nothing was said about the armed forces and paramilitary personnel who might register as local voters.
How might the revised electoral rolls change political representation in J&K? Apart from the new electors, refugees who came from West Pakistan would also get the right to vote in the assembly elections now. So would the Valmikis brought in from Punjab by the J&K state government to work as safai-karamcharis and scavengers. The BJP is eyeing their support along with that of other "outsiders"– construction workers, orchard workers and daily wagers -- who are residents in J&K and may want to exercise their franchise there. The migrant Kashmiri Pandits – whether in Jammu or elsewhere in India -- have mostly been with the BJP. The party expects they will remain loyal, especially after the official promotion of "The Kashmir Files", a film that weaponised the pain of Kashmiri Pandits.
Very importantly, the party may be eyeing the vote of the security forces posted in the region. Their presence is disproportionate to the local population and will matter more because assembly constituencies are relatively smaller in size in J&K than in other states. This is why political parties fear that the presence of security personnel among voters may impact the election results.
The process for a person in the security forces to de-register themselves in their home state and register anew as a voter in J&K is cumbersome. However, it can happen if there are orders from above. While the powers that be may be chary of interfering with the armed forces, the paramilitary forces come under the Union Home Ministry. It may not be beyond the Chanakyas of BJP to handle the paperwork centrally to facilitate registering paramilitary forces personnel posted in a peace station like Jammu as local voters. However, it remains to be seen how far the BJP is willing to face the political fallout of such measures.
In the end, all this strategising will make little difference to the electoral outcome. The BJP has already done whatever it could to tilt the balance in its favour. The Delimitation Commission has used criteria other than population to demarcate constituencies, with six of the seven additional assembly constituencies falling in Jammu. It also changed the boundaries of other constituencies -- J&K political parties claim to the advantage of the BJP. However, Muslim voters can still play a deciding role in 10 out of the 43 seats in Jammu. In the 47 seats in the Kashmir Valley, the BJP may be unable to open its account. Therefore, the arithmetic does not favour a BJP majority on its own.
The revision of electoral rolls could have some impact in Jammu. Earlier, the "state subject" classification excluded West Pakistan refugees from voting in the assembly elections, although they could vote for Parliament. Now they will be added to the state electoral rolls. However, their vote may not contribute to the BJP winning additional seats as they are settled mainly in Hindu-dominated areas of the Jammu region (e.g., Samba, Kathua, R S Pura), where the BJP was already strong. They have no presence in the Muslim-dominated areas (e.g., Rajouri, Poonch and Doda). The revised electoral roll would then only increase the victory margins of BJP in its pocket boroughs without adding new seats to its tally.
The Kashmir Valley relies on about 1 to 200,000 Bihari and UP workers in the construction industry, orchards and various activities in the informal sector. However, it is questionable whether they will be willing to invite the wrath of militant groups by trying to enrol as resident voters.
If targeted killings continue, the Kashmiri Pandit community may also not prove a reliable vote bank for the BJP. So far, BJP propaganda has conveniently deflected from the fact that when the 1990 migration of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley took place, a BJP-supported government of V P Singh ruled at the Centre. This time, it will be difficult for the BJP to shift the blame as it rules both in Delhi and in Srinagar through the Lieutenant Governor. The Kashmiri Pandits could blame the BJP for their continued insecurity, targeted killings and migration since 2019.
Therefore, the BJP's electoral designs are unlikely to be realised despite electoral roll revision and sundry gerrymandering. There could also be a downside to the path it has embarked on. The silence and absence of large-scale violence is being taken for tacit consent of the Kashmiris to the government's policy. There may be a cost to pay for this. In the eyes of the people of J&K, the tinkering with electoral processes leading up to the assembly elections is undeniably linked to the chicanery they witnessed on August 5, 2019.