US will have to keep in mind broad strategic ties with India: Navtej Sarna

The new Joe Biden administration is expected to boost US-India ties further. Though Trump’s policy on China is likely to continue, the sharp rhetoric will be missing, says Navtej Sarna, former ambassador to the US and high commissioner to the UK, in an interview with Aditi Phadnis. He also says the matter of defence procurement from Russia will require “constant tending”. Edited excerpts:

How do you read President Joe Biden's speech and his subsequent Executive Orders, including the promise to reform the visa regime including H1-B, in the context of relations with India? Will his stated commitment of fostering democracy across the world and defending religious freedom impact ties with the Indian government?

President Biden’s inaugural address was along expected lines — a call for national unity; a harking back to traditional values of democracy, truth, justice and equality; an expression of resolve to heal, repair and rebuild. It was also a sombre recognition of the daunting challenges that face the country: The pandemic that has claimed over 400,000 American lives, an economy in freefall, racial divisions, and a real threat of domestic terrorism from right-wing extremists.

He signed a flurry of executive orders on the first day, and more will follow, targeted at his priorities — the pandemic, climate, immigration, and racial inequality. Beyond the immediate immigration reversal of the travel ban on some Muslim majority countries and extending the protection for the ‘dreamers’, a major plan for an overhaul of the immigration system has been sent to the Congress. I understand this includes the doing away with the country-capping of employment-based immigration and carves a faster path to citizenship. This will help Indian professionals.

Democratic and constitutional traditions are a common bond between the two countries on which the edifice of the bilateral relationship stands. Any differences in appreciation of specific issues will no doubt be conveyed in quiet conversations within the ambit of the very wide, multifaceted strategic partnership.

The new president has a difficult choice in dealing with the legacy left behind by President Trump: On China and Pakistan; on Russia, which will immediately impact India's defence procurement; on Iran. How do you think he will deal with this? More foreign policy initiatives are expected in February. What do you think these could be?

The Biden team has much work to do on the international front, and Biden has given the message of engagement — the return to the Paris Accord and the halting of the withdrawal from the WHO are important beginnings. It will be interesting to see how the new Administration handles China. A certain amount of reset is expected, though that may be more in tone than in substance. All of Trump’s policies on China will not be rolled back as the new Administration is broadly in agreement with the direction of his approach, but the sharp rhetoric may be missing. The US is likely to contain and counter China through closer engagement with allies and partners, more stress on values than on power play. The competition is not going anywhere — the die is cast on the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, though the US may look for deals with China on climate change.

On Afghanistan, the policy in favour of withdrawal of US troops, with the exception of a small counter-insurgency force, is likely to continue. There are indications that the US will want to review the deal reached with the Taliban with a view to protecting human rights gains of the past years. Relations with Pakistan will also be impacted by how much the US needs it for its objectives in Afghanistan.

Relations with Russia are likely to be broadly adversarial, with the Putin-Trump lovefest a thing of the past. The immediate challenge is the New Start treaty due to expire in two weeks, for which an extension will be proposed; the Alexei Navalny episode is also likely to be in focus. As regards our defence procurement from Russia, this is a matter that will need constant tending. There is a recognition of our historic relations with Russia and the legacy of our weapon systems. But we are also buying much more from the US and there are greater comfort and interoperability between our forces with the signing of the foundational agreements and the increased complexity of exercises. There is also greater cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, including a deepening of the Quad. The US will have to keep in mind the broad strategic relationship with India, and not see it only through the narrow lens of the purchase of a Russian weapon system. A provision for a waiver from the CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) exists: Our broad relationship should make it difficult for the administration to cut its nose to spite its face by sanctioning a close strategic partner.

On Iran, the Biden administration is committed to re-entering the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) if Tehran returns to compliance. Iran will have to roll-back its increased stockpile of low-enriched uranium and stop operating its advanced centrifuges. It is doubtful, if the US sanctions are not lifted, that Iran will do all this in the short window available before it goes into elections in June. The US will like to use the JCPOA as a platform to seek a stronger agreement which addresses Iran’s ballistic missile programme and “destabilising activities” in West Asia. For this, the US will have to work not only with its European partners but also Israel and other Arab states.

There are many more foreign policy areas — a return to international institutions, Nato, Ukraine, North Korea, and so on.

The Biden Administration is expected to announce a Buy American programme shortly. To us in India, this sounds similar to the kind of protectionism the previous administration advocated. How should Indian business see this?

 The Buy American plan is aimed at increasing manufacturing within the country and up-gradation in technology and innovation. It will also bring critical supply chains home and create more jobs and increase worker welfare. There is an inevitable move towards protectionism around the world which comes out of a disillusionment with globalisation, a need to decouple supply chains to some extent from China, to revive economies and create jobs. Businesses will find their way to be part of this trend. No country can produce everything and mutually beneficial international trade is in everyone’s favour; unbalanced manufacturing concentration, predatory trade practices and stealing of technologies are not.