"While US and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan's nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Furthermore, continued Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons development could jeopardise strategic stability between the two countries," the Congressional Research Service (CRS) said in its latest report on nuclear weapons of Pakistan.
CRS, which is an independent and bipartisan research body of the US Congress, prepares periodic reports on issues of importance for lawmakers for them to take informed decisions.
In its 30-page report dated August 1, the CRS said that the China selling nuclear reactors to Pakistan for Chasa-3 and Chasma-4 are in violation of the current Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.
"US officials and other NSG members have said that the Chasma-3 and -4 sales by China are inconsistent with current Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines," CRS said in its reports, days after another US-based think-tank Arms Control Association (ACA) made similar allegations.
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Contracts for Chasma-1 and -2 were concluded before China joined the NSG in 2004.
In 2008, China and Pakistan agreed to the Chasma-3 and -4 construction "in response to the US-India Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement", according to a 2015 Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement submitted by the Obama Administration to Congress, it said.
China argues that the contracts for Chasma -3 and -4 are grandfathered, but Countryman stated that the NSG did not agree to grandfather any additional reactors.
The NSG changed its guidelines in 2008 to allow nuclear trade with India, but the group does not allow trade with Pakistan.
According to CRS report, although Pakistan has made significant reforms in this area, many observers continue to be concerned that other states or terrorist organisations could obtain material or expertise related to nuclear weapons from elements in Pakistan.
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However, Pakistani officials have expressed confidence in the security of its facilities and have said that Islamabad has no plans to transport spent fuel from either reactor, it said.
Furthermore, CRS said chronic political instability in Pakistan and Islamabad's military efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda have raised concerns about the security of the country's nuclear weapons.
"The collapse or near-collapse of the Pakistani government is probably the most likely scenario in which militants or terrorists could acquire Pakistani nuclear weapons," it said.
Noting that the main security challenges for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders, the report said some observers are also concerned about the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan.
"Nevertheless, Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and appears to be augmenting its weapons production facilities as well as deploying additional delivery vehicles- steps that will enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in Islamabad's nuclear arsenal," it added.
Some observers have also argued that Pakistan's expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called "full spectrum deterrence" indicate "the growing nuclearising of Pakistan's national security policy."