China conducted its nuclear tests in Inner Mongolia on October 16, 1964.
According to latest classified documents released in the US today, the State Department in 1963 prepared a major report on the potential consequences of a nuclear-armed China.
The report did not believe this event would "alter the real relations of power among the major states," but the US would have to find ways to reassure US allies, in part to forestall "the possibility of development of independent nuclear capabilities by Asian countries (especially India)."
US intelligence had been monitoring Chinese developments for some years but the lack of adequate sources made reliable estimates difficult.
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As prospects for a nuclear test began to appear imminent in the early 1960s, a lively debate commenced within the US government over how soon it would happen and what its implications would be.
Amid questions over whether Beijing would be "truculent" or "cautious" were proposals for taking preventive military action, possibly with Moscow's cooperation, or for finding ways such as reassuring Asian allies and changing the US military posture to adjust to the reality of a nuclear China.
According to the declassified documents, the Chinese leadership sought nuclear weapons because of their experience in confrontations with the United States during the 1950s.
In this respect, the 1955 Taiwan Straits crisis had central importance in Mao's decisions.
In another secret report dated June 1, 1964, the US discussed the possibility of a covert operation against the Chinese nuclear weapons programme.
The United States, however, could not be sure that its action would fully eliminate China's capability and in any case it could reconstruct its facilities.
The report also discusses alternatives such as broad US-Soviet defence guarantees, guarantees applicable only to India and an Asian nuclear-free zone.