 "A new book that explores how the Islamic State clicks")
ISLAMIC STATE THE DIGITAL CALIPHATE
Author: Abdel Bari Atwan
Publisher: Saqi Books, London
Pages: 256
Price: £16.99
A year ago, in June 2014, a new and mysterious militia dramatically captured the Iraqi town of Mosul, then guarded by about 20,000 troops who fled in panic, abandoning their weapons, uniforms and the citizens they were sworn to protect. This militia then moved rapidly to capture town after town in different parts of Iraq, reaching the outskirts of Baghdad in just three weeks. On the first day of Ramadan, on July 1, the leader of the group emerged briefly from the shadows, announcing that the “Islamic State” [IS] had been set up in the captured territories, and that he, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, from the lineage of Prophet Mohammed, would be its caliph. He also announced plans for global expansion, saying: “You will conquer Rome and own the world, if Allah wills.”
By the end of 2014, IS controlled half of Syria and a third of Iraq, territory nearly the size of Britain, with a population of six million. It had put in place a hierarchical leadership structure and a functioning administrative and judicial setup. It had an experienced and trained military force made up of jihadis, Saddam Hussain’s commanders and soldiers, and tribal leaders, and had access to substantial revenues from oil sales, robbery and ransom, which made it “the richest terrorist group in history”.
Though IS is in the news almost daily, the organisation and its leader remain largely unknown. In this comprehensive and well-researched book, Abdel Bari Atwan, perhaps one of the Arab world’s most distinguished commentators, has thrown considerable light on the IS phenomenon, explaining its origins, leadership, organisation and functioning, the sources of its strange allure for youth globally, and the role it is likely to play in coming years.
The origins of IS lie in two developments: the organisation of “global jihad” in Afghanistan in the 1980s, which gave birth to the transnational jihadi movement Al Qaeda, and provided ideologically-driven and battle-hardened veterans to pursue jihad in different theatres; and, later, the US assault on Iraq in 2003 that destroyed state order and institutions, infected the country with the virus of sectarianism, and opened it to penetration by jihadi forces. These forces initially gave lip-service to Al Qaeda, but later asserted their own independence, first under the Jordanian jihad veteran Abu Musab al Zarqawi and, from 2010, under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, described by Atwan as “the world’s most dangerous man”.
IS members make extensive use of social networking facilities, such as YouTube, Twitter, JustPaste, Instagram and Skype to disseminate their high-quality films and images, enter into conversations, post links to their propaganda material, set up their own sites and video games, facilitate secret discussions, provide recipes for bomb-making, identify and locate “enemies”, and even hack into government sites. They also have to strive to stay ahead of state authorities: in 2014, the US removed 45,000 jihad-related items from Internet sites while in the UK 1,100 items are removed weekly.
The digital effort of IS has been particularly effective in recruiting foreign members from across the world. The videos are of high quality and contain a variety of alluring messages. They are in different languages, often using the slang used by young people: the focus for young men is on the brotherhood of the street or “gang-bonding”; other inducements include references to the heroic and just causes they are supporting and, recently, to the sectarian factor as a motivational force. Martyrdom is projected as the cherished aim of jihad.
For women, the messages include references to clothing, shoes, bags, chocolates, cooking and cuddly kittens. But the menacing presence of jihad is never far away: while executions and beheadings are frequently depicted, even images directed at women have included a severed head in the hands of a female jihadi, and exaltation of the martyrdom of their husbands.
This media effort has obviously been successful: out of over 200,000 IS members there are 30,000 foreigners from 80 countries, with 7,000 having European nationality, including France, the UK and even Australia; women recruits number about 2,500.
The stage is now set for fierce rivalry between Al Qaeda, headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, and IS under Baghdadi. Several factors favour the ascendancy of the latter: his military successes, his financial prowess and his occupation of the heartland of the Arab world are obvious plus points. More important is the fact that Baghdadi represents the new generation of jihadis that has little memory of Osama bin Laden and for whom Zawahiri is a remote, unseen figure and, having no Internet capabilities, is increasingly seen as out of touch with the present generation and its aspirations.
Thus, over the past year, more and more jihadi organisations in different parts of the world are coming out in support of IS. These include leaders of the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), traditionally closest to Zawahiri, and those of Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar al Sharia in Libya, and Ansar Bait al Maqdis in the Sinai. Sections of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and even the Afghan Taliban have expressed support for IS and have called for the unity of the jihadi movement. They are recent reports that Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat Nusra and IS are coordinating military operations in Syria, while IS and AQAP are said to have collaborated in carrying out the Charlie Hebdo and related attacks in France.
Atwan points out that IS’s roots in West Asia are “geographical, ideological and political”. It is already seeking new targets for assault and expansion, with the ongoing sectarian conflicts in the region providing it with a propitious environment. He foresees the nightmare scenario in which the various jihadi groups in south and west Asia and north Africa could “web up and act together under the IS banner” and fears we could be looking at a new 30-year war. This outstanding book tells us how it all started.
The reviewer is a former diplomat
Author: Abdel Bari Atwan
Publisher: Saqi Books, London
Pages: 256
Price: £16.99
A year ago, in June 2014, a new and mysterious militia dramatically captured the Iraqi town of Mosul, then guarded by about 20,000 troops who fled in panic, abandoning their weapons, uniforms and the citizens they were sworn to protect. This militia then moved rapidly to capture town after town in different parts of Iraq, reaching the outskirts of Baghdad in just three weeks. On the first day of Ramadan, on July 1, the leader of the group emerged briefly from the shadows, announcing that the “Islamic State” [IS] had been set up in the captured territories, and that he, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, from the lineage of Prophet Mohammed, would be its caliph. He also announced plans for global expansion, saying: “You will conquer Rome and own the world, if Allah wills.”
By the end of 2014, IS controlled half of Syria and a third of Iraq, territory nearly the size of Britain, with a population of six million. It had put in place a hierarchical leadership structure and a functioning administrative and judicial setup. It had an experienced and trained military force made up of jihadis, Saddam Hussain’s commanders and soldiers, and tribal leaders, and had access to substantial revenues from oil sales, robbery and ransom, which made it “the richest terrorist group in history”.
Though IS is in the news almost daily, the organisation and its leader remain largely unknown. In this comprehensive and well-researched book, Abdel Bari Atwan, perhaps one of the Arab world’s most distinguished commentators, has thrown considerable light on the IS phenomenon, explaining its origins, leadership, organisation and functioning, the sources of its strange allure for youth globally, and the role it is likely to play in coming years.
The origins of IS lie in two developments: the organisation of “global jihad” in Afghanistan in the 1980s, which gave birth to the transnational jihadi movement Al Qaeda, and provided ideologically-driven and battle-hardened veterans to pursue jihad in different theatres; and, later, the US assault on Iraq in 2003 that destroyed state order and institutions, infected the country with the virus of sectarianism, and opened it to penetration by jihadi forces. These forces initially gave lip-service to Al Qaeda, but later asserted their own independence, first under the Jordanian jihad veteran Abu Musab al Zarqawi and, from 2010, under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, described by Atwan as “the world’s most dangerous man”.
IS members make extensive use of social networking facilities, such as YouTube, Twitter, JustPaste, Instagram and Skype to disseminate their high-quality films and images, enter into conversations, post links to their propaganda material, set up their own sites and video games, facilitate secret discussions, provide recipes for bomb-making, identify and locate “enemies”, and even hack into government sites. They also have to strive to stay ahead of state authorities: in 2014, the US removed 45,000 jihad-related items from Internet sites while in the UK 1,100 items are removed weekly.
The digital effort of IS has been particularly effective in recruiting foreign members from across the world. The videos are of high quality and contain a variety of alluring messages. They are in different languages, often using the slang used by young people: the focus for young men is on the brotherhood of the street or “gang-bonding”; other inducements include references to the heroic and just causes they are supporting and, recently, to the sectarian factor as a motivational force. Martyrdom is projected as the cherished aim of jihad.
For women, the messages include references to clothing, shoes, bags, chocolates, cooking and cuddly kittens. But the menacing presence of jihad is never far away: while executions and beheadings are frequently depicted, even images directed at women have included a severed head in the hands of a female jihadi, and exaltation of the martyrdom of their husbands.
This media effort has obviously been successful: out of over 200,000 IS members there are 30,000 foreigners from 80 countries, with 7,000 having European nationality, including France, the UK and even Australia; women recruits number about 2,500.
The stage is now set for fierce rivalry between Al Qaeda, headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, and IS under Baghdadi. Several factors favour the ascendancy of the latter: his military successes, his financial prowess and his occupation of the heartland of the Arab world are obvious plus points. More important is the fact that Baghdadi represents the new generation of jihadis that has little memory of Osama bin Laden and for whom Zawahiri is a remote, unseen figure and, having no Internet capabilities, is increasingly seen as out of touch with the present generation and its aspirations.
Thus, over the past year, more and more jihadi organisations in different parts of the world are coming out in support of IS. These include leaders of the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), traditionally closest to Zawahiri, and those of Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar al Sharia in Libya, and Ansar Bait al Maqdis in the Sinai. Sections of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and even the Afghan Taliban have expressed support for IS and have called for the unity of the jihadi movement. They are recent reports that Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat Nusra and IS are coordinating military operations in Syria, while IS and AQAP are said to have collaborated in carrying out the Charlie Hebdo and related attacks in France.
Atwan points out that IS’s roots in West Asia are “geographical, ideological and political”. It is already seeking new targets for assault and expansion, with the ongoing sectarian conflicts in the region providing it with a propitious environment. He foresees the nightmare scenario in which the various jihadi groups in south and west Asia and north Africa could “web up and act together under the IS banner” and fears we could be looking at a new 30-year war. This outstanding book tells us how it all started.
The reviewer is a former diplomat