Back in 1829, a Maltese shopkeeper was beaten up by Greek soldiers. Malta was a British possession and the shopkeeper was thus a British subject.
Since the British had been looking for an excuse to establish their political supremacy in the Mediterranean, they sent a flotilla to teach the Greeks a lesson. The Greek navy, such as it was, was destroyed in harbour.
India, which is wringing its hands in distress over how to handle the Lankan situation, can draw at least one inference from that precedent: define your goal and then do what it takes to achieve it. If you can't define your goal, start doing so.
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It has become de rigueur now to point to the IPKF disaster and say that the same error should not be repeated. Those who argue thus, however, may be missing a crucial point.
This is that military intervention in a quarrel that is not your own is only partially intended to make a military point. It is designed, by and large, to make a political point. Indeed, often, the military aspect is incidental to the total exercise.
Consider the central European situation after the break-up of the USSR. The West didn't intervene in Bosnia during 1993-96 but did so in Kosovo in 1998. What was the difference? What explained the sudden sympathy for European Muslims?
The answer lies in the political point that needed to be made. This was to reassure the various regimes all over West Asia that the West would not allow them to come under threat from Islamic radicals.
The reassurance had become necessary because, following the failure of the West in Bosnia, the radicals groups in West Asia had received a major boost. They had begun to propagate that only they could prevent the oppression and extermination of Muslims. This had frightened the living daylights out of the governments in the region.
The point of the Kosovo intervention was thus mainly political: to ensure that friendly Islamic government in West Asia did not come under radical threat. This was the political objective and once it had been clearly defined, the West did not hesitate to intervene. (It's harder to the same in Chechnya because the Russians are involved directly).
So far, to the best of my knowledge, India has not spelt out any such overarching political objective. The closest it has come to it is to say that it is not in favour of Pakistani (or Israeli) intervention in Sri Lanka. That's fair enough.
But what beyond it? Should it not come out with an unequivocal statement that it does not wish to see Sri Lanka's territorial integrity threatened?
In fairness, though, the problem is complicated by the fact that the people of Tamil Nadu see the Jaffna Tamils as honorary Indian citizens. They thus seek tacit intervention on their behalf or, since that is not possible, at least no intervention against them.
The principle inherent in this is not very different from the rallying cries heard elsewhere in the world. Be it the Islamic radicals in West Asia, Tamils, Whites ( in Zimbabwe right now), Christians or whatever, it is commonplace to make common cause.
The Indian refusal to intervene in Sri Lanka is mystifying. It makes sense only if India is certain that, first, there is no danger to the integrity of Sri Lanka and, second, that this Sri Lankan government -- and the ones that follow -- will overlook the fact when Sri Lanka turned to India for help, the help was not forthcoming.
It is easy to take refuge behind the convenient cloak of coalition politics. But, as last Friday's meeting between Mr Karunanidhi and Mr Vajpayee showed, it wasn't all that hard to convince the former of the national interest. Mr Karunanidhi has said that he will "not tie the government's hands".
It is also argued that India must not intervene in Sri Lanka when the Sri Lankan troops are themselves running away from battle. Why fight their battle when they are not willing to do it themselves, is the oft-heard question.
It is also said that India does not want an independent Tamil homeland and that even if one should get created, India need not recognise it. Without Indian recognition, the new country will not get anywhere.
Lastly, it is argued that the best policy is to wait and watch and see how things pan out. The reasoning here is that taking Jaffna isn't enough and much will depend on what happens to the eastern province which would be harder for the Tamil militants to hold.
There are thus powerful reasons for not intervening and, indeed, not doing anything at all. But two questions arise from such a policy of inaction.
If the Sri Lankan Tamils do announce a new state, what will India do in the face of pressure from Tamil Nadu? Can it really not recognise it if there is a threat to the government?
Furthermore, if such a state does get created, and if India shuns it, who will step in to fill the vacuum? Foreign ministry experts say that no one will.
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