BSF's unsung role in 1971

Journalist Ushinor Majumdar's book brings to light the Border Security Forces' pivotal role in shaping Bangladesh's liberation in 1971, a role that has gone unmentioned in earlier narratives

India’s Secret War: BSF and Nine Months to The Birth of Bangladesh

Author: Ushinor Majumdar

Publisher: 

Penguin

Pages: 289

Price: Rs 499

In late March 1971, when the Pakistan Army started a genocidal crackdown in what was then East Pakistan, India’s Border Security Force (BSF) was thrust onto the frontline in an undeclared war.

The BSF had been raised in the wake of the Indo-Pak war of 1965 to safeguard India’s borders. When Sheikh Mujibur Rahman raised the call for Bangladesh’s liberation in March 1971, the BSF was still led by its first Commander Khusrau Rustamji, an Indian Police Service officer. It was officered by a motley combination of officers seconded (or retired) from the army and the police, and it had absorbed various state police units with border patrol experience.

Importantly, a number of those posted on the East Pakistan border were Bengalis, which meant easy communications with Bangladeshis.  The BSF was the first responder as millions of refugees poured across the 4,000 km border and its outposts had to deal with this influx. It processed refugees as they arrived — a task that soon reached gigantic scales.

The BSF was also a primary facilitator of the guerrilla war that followed. During the nine months before war was officially declared, India trained and supplied the Bangladeshi Mukti Bahini. The Mukti Bahini criss-crossed the border to operate against conventional Pakistani forces, and against the civilian allies of the Pakistanis, the Urdu-speaking Razakars.

The BSF also provided safe houses and logistical support for Bangladeshi leaders, who set up a government in exile in Park Circus, Calcutta, after taking over what used to be the Pakistan High Commission (it was almost entirely staffed by Bengalis).

At the borders, the BSF ferried the Mukti Bahini to and fro and many BSF personnel wore mufti to accompany the Mukti Bahini on raids. The guerrillas made it hard for Pakistanis to move out of their bunkers, by ambushing convoys on the roads and blowing up boats on rivers.

When guerrilla conflict transitioned into open war on December 3, and Indian conventional forces entered Bangladesh, the intelligence the BSF had gathered and the links it had painstakingly built with Bengali freedom fighters proved a force-multiplier. The BSF was used from October onwards to front probing attacks into Bangladesh along with the Mukti Bahini, with the army following up.

This book by an award-winning journalist chronicles the BSF’s contribution to the war effort. The BSF’s role has by and large, gone unmentioned, or even been treated dismissively in earlier narratives. But earlier histories of the Bangladesh War did not access the BSF’s internal data and most writers did not look to interview BSF officers and personnel. So this book fills a gaping hole and there's a lot of new material.

On March 28, 1971, at a high-level meeting, where Sam Manekshaw (another Parsi) was present, the Indian government decided to aid the Bangla rebels. Rustamji received succinct verbal instructions from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi “Do what you like, but don’t get caught!”

This led to the BSF shifting resources and senior commanders to near key border crossing points, and it led to liaisons with the armed forces and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which was then led by the legendary R N Kao. Kao worked out a coherent strategy to set fire to East Pakistan but the BSF was key to delivering on this and developing assets on the ground.

The book maintains a breakneck pace. It uses an interesting structure interspersing the overarching historical narrative of the battle to liberate Bangladesh in its broad contours with detailed accounts of operations where the BSF was involved.

Going beyond training, Bengali BSF officers (many of them combat veterans from 1962 and 1965) were involved in a whole range of covert operations including deep penetration raids where they ambushed Pakistani patrols, blew up bridges, and created localised mayhem.  For example, they were intimately associated with Major Zia-ur-Rahman’s (later President of Bangladesh) efforts in fighting the Pakistan Army in Chittagong.

Post-monsoon, the Pakistan Army also organised its local militia, the Razakars and started hitting back with cross-border raids into India. Then it became a game of cat-and-mouse with the BSF and Mukti Bahini gaining the upper hand due to superior local intelligence and civilian support.

By October, the BSF was actually carrying out set-piece conventional attacks on Pakistani outposts, and many BSF officers and jawans were decorated for their efforts.  Interestingly, the BSF was also in the thick of the early fighting on the western front, as border outposts were attacked in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Punjab. There, too, it acquitted itself well.

All this helped the BSF to gather detailed, granular intelligence of course.  Apart from military activities, the BSF was also heavily involved in the Swadhin Bangla Betaar Kendro (The Free Bangladesh Radio Service), offering technical support and arranging equipment as well as managing the various artistes who broadcast. It also managed the bandobust for journalists and foreign dignitaries who visited the refugee camps and border outposts.  So it played a role in managing the flow of information to the global press as well.

In all, the BSF suffered around 650 casualties in action between March and December 1971. It played a key role in a multitude of “shaping operations” before the conventional campaign that liberated Bangladesh. This book places that role in context.