Institutional Roots of India’s Security Policy
Editor: Milan Vaishnav
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Pages: 336
Price: Rs 1,440
In recent years, several books have been published on India’s national security, but what makes this volume edited by Milan Vaishnav both unique and especially useful, is its comprehensive description and critical analysis of the institutional underpinnings of India’s security policy. Dr Vaishnav must be complimented on assembling a group of bright and relatively young academics as contributors, who bring both rigour and acuity to their examination of a complex and often opaque subject. This is an opportune time to explore the various institutions through which the Indian state seeks to uphold the security of the country because they are inevitably being affected by the rapid and significant shifts taking place in both the domestic and external security environment.
The book is divided into four parts. Part 1 looks at the Indian armed forces — the Army, Navy and Air Force, their strengths and vulnerabilities. Part 2 examines the structure and capacities of the country’s premier intelligence agencies, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) for external operations and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) with a domestic remit. Neither has any legal instrument as its basis and therefore, are not subject to parliamentary or judicial oversight.
Part 3 is devoted to agencies responsible for internal and border security. They include the Assam Rifles, which is deployed in the Northeast both for guarding the border with Myanmar and China (through Arunachal Pradesh); the Rashtriya Rifles, deployed in Jammu and Kashmir for counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations. Assam Rifles functions under, and is financed through, the home ministry but is operationally under the Indian Army. The Rashtriya Rifles is under the defence ministry and functions under the operational control of the Indian Army. The other paramilitary formations are the Indo-Tibetan Border Force (ITBP), primarily serving as a border guarding force on the Sino-Indian border; the Seema Suraksha Bal (SSB), which is currently deployed on the India-Nepal and India-Bhutan borders; and the Border Security Force, which guards the India-Pakistan and the India-Bangladesh borders. These are under the home ministry. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is the largest paramilitary force (over 330,000) available for internal security duties throughout the country in support of state police forces and for anti-insurgency operations against the Naxal and Maoist armed revolutionary movements. The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), also under the home ministry, guards industrial and commercial establishments, airports and other critical infrastructure. And the National Security Guard (NSG) was set up as a commando force. While under the home ministry, it is managed operationally by the defence ministry.
Part 4 is devoted to the premier investigative agencies, the Central Bureau of Investigation, which covers criminal matters, and the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which focuses on anti-terrorism.
The book acknowledges the positive role played by the country’s security system against difficult odds. But it has identified certain common challenges that confront virtually all the different security-related institutions. They suffer from lack of capacity on the one hand but have to manage overlapping and ambiguous jurisdictions on the other. They are plagued by significant and persistent vacancies at all levels. They tend to be top heavy with better trained and better paid personnel at senior levels but ill-trained and poorly treated lower ranks. A feudal culture pervades the security forces. Constables often serve as domestic staff for senior police officers and so do soldiers for higher rank military officers. The intelligence agencies operate in a legal limbo, immune from parliamentary scrutiny and public accountability. And none of the institutions are geared to stay ahead of the technology curve.
The study is comprehensive enough but there could have been a further elaboration of the changes brought about in the wake of India becoming a declared nuclear weapon state in 1998. This led to the setting up of the National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the prime minister and including the ministers of home, external affairs, defence and finance. The newly established office of the National Security Advisor (NSA) was a major departure in the national security system. He serves as secretary to the NSC. There is no legal sanction for the office of the NSA but he has emerged as a critical and indispensable node in the security system, both domestic and external and in the nuclear domain.
The National Security Council Secretariat is now a powerful institution headed by the NSA and currently deploys three deputy NSAs. There is a large complement of officers on deputation from other security agencies. It is both a central intelligence processing and evaluation centre as well as a policy research and analysis platform. The NSC is supported by a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) composed of eminent but retired public officials, domain experts and academics who advise on a wide range of national security issues. The Indian nuclear doctrine in the aftermath of the nuclear tests of 1998, was drawn up by the NSAB. During the time I was chairing the NSAB, it had worked on a draft national security strategy but this could not be put in the public domain.
The book should have also looked at the institution of the Chief of Defence Services (CDS) who will play a key role in the setting up of theatre commands and in the nuclear command authority and the Strategic Forces Command, which manages India’s nuclear deterrent
This sets the agenda for a further study but Dr Vaishnav’s edited volume will remain an indispensable and one of the best researched reference volumes on India’s national security system.
The reviewer is a former foreign secretary and served as chairman, National Security Advisory Board (2013-15)