Why policies fail

Policymaking is not an easy job, and State Capability in India sheds light on the complexities of this task

State Capability in India

Authors: T V Somanathan & Gulzar Natarajan

Publisher:Oxford University Press

Pages: 446

Price: Rs 1,495

The mismatch between the promises and delivery of the Indian state is striking and intriguing. Even after spending trillions of rupees over seven decades, school learning outcomes are poor, child and maternal mortalities remain high, farm and firm productivity are low, crime rates are high, and legal and regulatory compliances are poor. Experts and commentators attribute this to poor execution of policies. “Policies are good, but implementation is bad” is a constant refrain. The reality, however, is nuanced and multifaceted for those with boots on the ground.

The book State Capability in India examines the complex world of policymaking and execution. It has 16 chapters organised along four themes. The authors, senior IAS officers, define the state’s capability as its ability to design, implement and deliver what it promises. They ask, “Why is it so difficult to formulate a ‘right’ policy and then stick to it? What can be done to improve things?” They argue that design and implementation are interdependent parts of policymaking. A “right” design must factor in the implementation challenges.

Chapters 1-4 review the leading theories of state capability and describe the organisation of the Indian state  — the political executive, the civil service, and their interface with the judiciary. Chapter 5 assesses the state’s capability, starting with the civil services, using four criteria:  The preservation of the constitutional order; an impartial implementation of the law of the land; implementation of the will of the elected executive; and economic development.

According to the authors, the civil services’ performance has been outstanding on the first count. It has belied expectations on the second count, however — the poor and the weak have received shabby treatment. On the third dimension, performance is mixed. The political executive and civil services are jointly responsible. The record is disappointing on the economic development front, marred by policy uncertainty, delayed decisions, corruption and parochial approaches.

Further, the integrity and impartiality of civil servants have declined over time. The book provides fascinating insights into the underlying causes. The proliferation of regulatory bodies has adversely affected career incentives and increased the scope for political interference. An expansive judicial interpretation of the safeguards in Article 311 has, in effect, protected the inefficient and negligent. The low punishment rate has made corruption an appealing option.

Besides, competence and domain knowledge are under stress. The willingness among the top officials to make specific policy recommendations has taken a hit as an unintended consequence of the use of autonomy by entities such as the Comptroller & Auditor General and the courts.

While the scope of the state’s activities has expanded drastically, the staff size has not increased commensurately. Contrary to the perception of an oversized government, Chapter 6 argues that the executive is understaffed and under-resourced. The number of civil servants — police personnel, judges, doctors, teachers, firefighters, and so on — is far below the international average. In sociological terms, the Weberian state in India is paper-thin, making the officials multi-task aggressively. The Indian bureaucrat is more efficient than is being credited for, but the civil service remains ineffective due to deficient organisational structures and resource constraints.

The discussion on the effect of court orders on the state’s capability is incisive and persuasive. It reveals how the courts’ emphasis on fairness to individuals hampers the common good by encouraging employee-employer litigation and administrative inefficiency. Chapter 7 focuses on the shortcomings of government organisations. Successful policy execution requires active coordination among related ministries and departments. Central and state ministries, however, suffer from excessive (horizontal) fragmentation. Simultaneously, there is an unhealthy integration of policy-making and implementation functions within ministries. Chapter 8 discusses how  counterfactual enquiries without adequate appreciation of the context have made the senior officials risk-averse. Second-guessing the merits of executive actions by the courts has aggravated the problem.

The “implementation deficit”, the most critical deficiency in India’s state capability, is examined in Chapter 9. It highlights the shortcomings of the governance structure for making policies vis-à-vis their execution. It draws upon the “systems approach”, the “public choice theory” and the principal-agent framework to explain the vicious cycle involving poor delegation to frontline personnel, the prevalence of mistrust, and a lack of accountability for shoddy performance.  Without improving the incentive structure and organisational design, authors argue, it is futile to expect civil servants to come good with what is expected of them. Chapters 10-16 propose several bold suggestions to improve the capability of the Centre and the states. The internship route is proposed to identify the motivated  civil servants.

The analysis is scholarly, detailed and balanced. The authors’ take on some issues, however, seems biased by their experience and profession. For example, their arguments for a restrictive scope of lateral entry into civil services. Some critical issues are not adequately discussed, such as, why have some prime ministers and chief  ministers been more effective than others, though working with the same state machinery.

Overall, the book provides a comprehensive analytical (general equilibrium) framework to think about state capability. Serious discussions are interspersed with amusing anecdotes and quotes, including Charan Singh’s famous analogy of the dynamics between bureaucrats and the political executive with the relationship between a ghoda (horse) and ghudswar (its rider). The book is an invaluable resource for understanding processes and entities involved in policy-making and execution, their strengths and weaknesses, and what needs to be done.

The reviewer is director and professor, Delhi School of Economics, and director, Delhi School of Public Policy and Governance