The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rose on the crest of a pro-Narendra Modi wave to score its best ever showing in Uttar Pradesh, India’s premier political state, and establishing the pre-eminence of Prime Minister Modi and Amit Shah, the BJP president and Modi’s closest political associate in the national polity, the BJP and the larger Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) fraternity.
Defying most political assessments that maintained even on the eve of counting that UP would throw up an inconclusive verdict despite the odds favouring the BJP and speculating on the likelihood of a composite alliance that would include the Samajwadi Party, the Congress and the Bahujan Samaj Party to form a coalition government and fend off the BJP, the party went way upwards of the half-way mark of 202 in the state legislature and catapulted to a magical tally of 304, according to the trends available. This is the highest ever a party got after 1989 when the Congress’s hegemony started to weaken.
The ruling SP and the BSP were reduced to double digit figures, going by the trends: the SP, helmed by “poster boy” and chief minister Akhilesh Yadav who was partnered by the Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi, at 71 and the BSP at 20 in the 403-member assembly. Akhilesh, who banked on his “development” programmes that showcased the still-to-roll Lucknow Metro rail and the Lucknow-Agra Expressway, was swamped by huge anti-incumbency that towards the end of electioneering manifested itself in the form of the jokes circulating over his signature “kam bolta hai” (my work speaks) slogan. His endeavor to confront his father and SP founder, Mulayam Singh Yadav and his uncle Shivpal Singh Yadav succeeded when he wrested control over the party and had his say in the distribution of tickets. But Akhilesh’s effort to do a Modi and rise above the party and its old order to establish his pre-eminence failed. The failure of the SP-Congress combine proved that UP had little appetite for the “inheritors” , living off their inheritances, and preferred an entity that placed a premium on hard work, collective effort and a leadership that emerged after decades of struggle.
Indeed, Shah began working on the UP assembly polls a few months after the BJP swept the Lok Sabha election in 2014. The prongs of the BJP’s strategy were working to build an unusual constituency of the most backward castes and the extremely backward Dalits and the traditional upper castes. In focussing on these social groupings, Shah and the BJP went beyond the usual matrix that was built on the well-known “vote banks” that had the Muslims, Yadavs, the Jatavs who make up the upper crust of the Dalits and the upper castes. These groupings were for long looking at a place under the political sun.
Second, rather than elect a CM candidate for fear it would expose the caste faultlines within the BJP, the party based its campaign on the personality and image of Modi, assuming that he had more credibility with the voters than Akhilesh or Mayawati.
Third, and importantly, the BJP used demonetisation to infuse a class dimension in its strategy, hoping that it would create a constituency of the poor who saw “note bandhi” as a weapon that levelled the economic and social playing field against the rich. It worked.
The recognition of the poor as a class worked against the BSP that put in its worst every performance.
Unlike the SP and the BSP that picked up seats in designated pockets, the BJP spread itself the state over, turning in an impressive showing even in west UP where it was believed that it had lost the Jat support.
To read the full story, Subscribe Now at just Rs 249 a month