Behind the 'Global South'

The geopolitical phrase of 2023 - but what does it actually mean?

India has, in recent times, sought to position itself as the leader of “the Global South”. If not as an unquestioned leader, at least as the loudest spokesperson. What is the Global South? What does India seek from this positioning? And is there anything material beyond the rhetoric?

The Global South is not easy to identify or delineate. Wealth may not matter, as oil-rich Gulf monarchies very definitely locate themselves as part of the Global South. What matters, as the name suggests, is that it is not part of the traditional geopolitical power bases of the Northern Hemisphere. Not Russia, not the West (and, by extension, not Japan). Is this just another way of referring to what used to be called during the Cold War the “third world”, as opposed to the first (developed) and second (communist) worlds?

Perhaps not, since there is one big exception to any broad identification of the “third world” or “developing” economies with the Global South. And that exception might also explain why the Indian government in particular is so anxious to push forward this concept.

That exception is the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC has been determined to ensure that, however rich it grows or large its footprint in the world economy might become, it remains identified as a developing economy and in competition with the West. President Xi Jinping made this explicit at the Brics summit in South Africa recently when he said that China “is and always will be one of the developing economies”. Not, note, that China will always be a developing economy. But that it will stand amidst the developing economies of the world and, thus, will expect their support in any confrontation with the West. Mr Xi’s presidency has centred this vision, not least through the Belt and Road Initiative. The third forum of BRI leaders was held in Beijing last week, and while the number of nations attending has decreased every year, Beijing’s intent seems unchanged. If the developing world is to be led, then it thinks that is China’s job.

It is this assumption that New Delhi is contesting through its championing of the Global South — which is, essentially, the developing world minus China. In some sense, the Global South is a non-aligned Third World for the new, US-China cold war.

For India, the benefits of this idea catching on are manifold. For one, it will ensure that support for Beijing among Indian partners in the developing world is not automatic. It gives some hope to countries — especially in Southeast Asia — that are eager to avoid being caught between Chinese dominance and Western patronage that there might be another option out there. And it gives our leadership yet another chance to demonstrate to an electorate hungry for global status that they are skilfully raising India’s profile in the world. India’s leadership of the Global South is “Vishwaguru” manifest.

There are other, more altruistic, reasons why the Indian leadership might wish the notion of the Global South to become mainstream. One is that there is a genuine sense of grievance across much of the developing world that needs to be given a voice. This anger began during the pandemic, when the south suffered without vaccines while the north inoculated its populations multiple times over. The unequal recovery, in which many developing countries built up debt but also failed to make up the growth losses of 2020-22, will have added to this discontent. And it is not only the West that is a target in this case: China, which failed to contain the pandemic early on and which is a major stumbling block to the resolution of a burgeoning sovereign debt crisis, is also the subject of criticism in many poorer countries. The food and fuel instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the consequent Western sanctions may have been the last straw. Indian policymakers might be concerned that, unless they give this inchoate anger an outlet and a platform, we may be close to a breakdown in all forms of multilateral cooperation. India’s championship of the Global South could be argued to be a good faith effort to protect and renew multilateralism.

But what, concretely, could India bring to a Global South grouping? On what could it base its claim to leadership? This is a much harder question. The PRC can point to its trading relations, its BRI, and the multiple other tangible benefits that come from having access to Beijing’s treasury. India does not have these resources. All it has is its reputation.

So it is using that reputation. Consider its plans for the Middle East, where the India-Middle East- Europe Corridor or IMEEC is basically backed by European money, American security, and Indian goodwill. Or plans for the Quad grouping to expand into development partnerships in additional countries that might be wary of the West but not with India. India may not be able to compete with China on resources. But if it can use Western resources and its own reputation to bolster its leadership credentials, then everything might work out.

This can only be a successful tactic, of course, if India continues to be seen as relatively unthreatening by other developing nations. As its footprint grows, it will have to avoid turning into another China that alienates its former Third World friends. New Delhi cannot afford too many more Maldives, where a recent election showed how India’s high profile has turned into a disadvantage. The government has paid considerable attention to raising India’s profile. It should also now consider working to ensure that profile is uniformly positive.

The writer is director, Centre for the Economy and Growth, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi