Demography without a TFR obsession: Rethinking birth-rate solutions

Ever since politicians and public intellectuals internalised the truth embedded in the statement “demography is destiny”, they have been trying to roll back the tide. In Europe and America, they have tried to do this by focusing on restricting illegal immigration, which is impacting their demography, and in India, we think it is all about raising the total fertility rate (TFR). A TFR of around 2.1 live births per woman is considered ideal to keep population levels stable.

 

In October, the chief ministers of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu fretted about falling TFRs in their two states, and indicated that they may incentivise families to produce more children. According to data from the latest National Family Health Survey and other reports, while Tamil Nadu has a TFR of 1.8, Andhra has 1.7. Bihar leads the table with a massive TFR of 3, while Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand figure lower at 2.4 and 2.3, indicating that even in parts of the populous Hindi belt, rates are falling.

 

A few days ago, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh chief, Mohan Bhagwat, raised the same issue and suggested that women should opt to have three children. Though he did not specifically say so, he was probably referring to the relatively low TFRs among Hindus compared to Muslims.

 

For the southern states, which will lose Lok Sabha seats after the next Census and delimitation exercise, raising birth rates seems like a priority. It’s not going to work, for women may not choose to have more children just to receive some incentives or for political reasons. Birth rates start falling when economic conditions improve and women receive good quality education and take up jobs. As one’s economic situation improves, the cost of raising children also rises disproportionately, as schooling and healthcare costs zoom. So, merely receiving cash bonuses or more maternity leave is not going to cut it for them.

 

Politicians and social scientists think they have the tools to dictate or incentivise human behaviour, but outside coercive states like Mao’s China or Pol Pot’s Cambodia, they have no such power. The short point is not that you cannot influence private behaviours by instituting a reasonable system of incentives and penalties, but that focusing too much on that alone will ultimately be counterproductive. Consider how much damage was done by the late Sanjay Gandhi’s forced sterilisation programme during the Emergency when population growth was considered a huge problem. The real problem was not population, but inadequate food production. Once the Green Revolution took off, the population problem also became less worrisome. Today, just because we think the opposite is the problem, it does not mean we are going to be any more successful. We must focus more on the solutions to depopulation, rather than fixating on raising TFR levels.

 

Here are several reasons why trying to control demography by targeting TFRs may not work too well. It may also lead to more social tensions.

 

First, if a government incentivises, say, more births per woman, what is the possibility that the message will resonate more with the better-off sections than with the poor or illegal immigrants? Do we want the poor to have more children, or the rich, given that it is the latter who can afford to provide their progeny with a good start in life?

 

Second, trying to influence TFRs primarily because a state may lose Lok Sabha seats (in proportion, if not in absolute terms) runs contrary to what the Constitution actually supports: Raising seats for some categories and groups when their share in the population rises. The reserved seats for SCs and STs were increased from 79 to 84 and 41 to 47 in the Lok Sabha based on their rising share of the population in the 2001 Census. If this is acceptable, opposing an increased share for Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, or Jharkhand based on the same logic is faulty. The interests of the southern states can be protected by other means — say, by raising the threshold for constitutional amendments, or giving them a few more Rajya Sabha seats.

 

Third, if southern politicians have long claimed demographic virtue by arguing that they controlled their populations in line with the national goal until recently, the goalposts have now changed. In terms of falling TFRs, they are actually underperformers relative to what the nation needs. The country’s TFR-based “demographic dividend” is coming from the Hindi belt, not the South. It is the North that must be rewarded for keeping the country’s TFR flag flying.

 

Fourth, the real problem in changing demography is the social tension it causes if most of the population deficit is met by immigration from cultures that are alien to the host country or society. That is what needs tackling. So, what is one driving at? Simple. It is foolish to fight demographic trends at the level of family decisions alone. It is better to take declining TFRs as a given and focus on what needs to be done.

 

When it comes to retaining more Lok Sabha seats, the South would be better off inviting more permanent settlers from the Hindi belt and encouraging them to learn Tamil or Telugu so that the migrants can merge more seamlessly with local culture. This is a far more realistic goal than trying to incentivise TFRs, though there is no harm in making the state more family-, women- and child-friendly. That can never be wrong.

 

Countries and states with falling TFRs should seek more investments in technology and businesses that cater to an older population. They can consider raising retirement ages for government and private sector staff while also promoting higher savings rates during one’s working life. Pensions cannot be excessive when the number of new contributors is shrinking, and this includes pensions for government staff and the armed forces. Governments can also, selectively, encourage more automation to help senior citizens cope with their needs when there are fewer children around to take care of them.

 

The real issue is the rate of demographic change, especially through immigration, which brings social instability and unwanted tensions. States would be wise to dump the old liberal attitude to immigration and focus on regulating it. They should insist that people migrating from other cultures should compulsorily adapt and learn the culture of the host country. In Denmark, if you are seeking citizenship by naturalisation, you have to know the language and the culture of the country. You also have to declare allegiance and loyalty to Denmark and Danish society, and follow fundamental Danish values, including Danish democratic norms.

 

In India, where the majority community fears efforts by religious groups to convert Hindus, one condition for allowing immigrants in should be that they do not engage in any conversion activity and respect Hindu culture and values. New immigrants cannot be allowed to form ghettoes where they live as separate cultural islands — this is what creates the separatist mindset. Also, work permits without ultimate citizenship rights can be liberalised to allow for the natural flow of labour from low-wage countries to higher-wage ones.

 

Demography may be destiny, but the solutions do not lie in asking women to sacrifice more than they already have. Not in a country where the burden of raising a family has fallen heavily on their shoulders, and they are only now beginning to taste the first whiff of freedom and independence. 

 

The author is a senior journalist