India's West Asia security dynamics

Despite its stakes in the region, its policy doesn't aim for long-term regional stability

We are now in the seventh month of the Israel-Hamas war, and there is no end in sight. There is no end in sight because the political survival of the Israeli leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, rests on the continuation of the war and its escalation into a regional conflict. The aerial bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1 and the killing of several senior officers of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards present on the premises was a calculated and cynical attempt to provoke Iranian retaliation.

While further escalation has been contained, thanks to US intervention and Iranian restraint, attention has been diverted from Israel’s brutal and horrific decimation of Palestinians in Gaza and the growing attacks on Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank. The illegal Israeli settlements are expanding in an area that could become a future Palestinian state. The frenetic expansion of these settlements and the dispossession and forced eviction of the Palestinians living on their ancestral lands, make any two-state solution chimerical. Its revival and more energetic espousal in the wake of the Gaza War notwithstanding, no serious analyst would consider it a realistic possibility, even more so after the October 7 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel and the still unfolding humanitarian disaster in Gaza, for which Israel is directly responsible. The minimal mutual trust and confidence between the Israelis and Palestinians required to enable a viable two-state solution have simply evaporated. It is no longer possible to just dial back to the Oslo Accords of 1993 which conceived that outcome in very different circumstances. It was never pursued with seriousness by the main stakeholders, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, then headed by the legendary Yasser Arafat. The US, in its unipolar moment of unconstrained power after the end of the Cold War, failed to deliver when the moment was ripe. A strategic opportunity does not lie on the shelf to be picked up at will.

The US perspective changed after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. In its wake, anti-Islamic sentiment became and remains pervasive. There was no longer any pressure on Israel to deliver its part in the Oslo Accords. The two-state solution is now beyond its expiry date. It is dishonest on the part of the US, the Arab states and the international community represented by the UN, including India, to peddle it once again as a solution to the current conflict, knowing full well that the conditions that had once made it a bold and realistic initiative no longer exist.

The US no longer enjoys the agency it possessed in the early 1990s. It believes, with Israel, that instead of seeking an admittedly difficult and complex political solution to the Palestinian issue, managing its security consequences may be a more realistic path forward. We have seen this in longstanding conflicts in other parts of the world. Treating a conflict as a security challenge rather than a political one, to be managed through the instruments of coercive state power, may appear easier, if shortsighted. This is likely to be the trajectory on the ground. 

Arab states have become complicit in this approach. Israel has so far not paid any price in its relations with important Gulf and West Asian states, including Egypt and Jordan and the UAE and Bahrain. This is despite the Arab street in all these states becoming more and more agitated over the inhuman suffering being perpetrated on their Palestinian brethren by Israeli forces in Gaza and the West Bank. There is growing moral outrage in many other parts of the world. In India, however, the expressions of sympathy for the Palestinians, an unwavering constant since India’s independence, has been discouraged. India hopes that it will be able to persist with its successful, simultaneous pursuit of mutually profitable relations with both Israel and the Arab states. It has not been forced to choose sides so far. Given India’s stakes in West Asia, its current policy may appear the most optimal. It is serving India’s energy security by maintaining friendly relations with the oil kingdoms. It is promoting the welfare of some six million Indians who live and work in the region. And it is creating economic and commercial opportunities for an expanding Indian economy. The strong partnership with Israel is bolstering India’s defence capabilities and helping it to deal with international terrorism. In the aftermath of the Israel-Hamas war and China’s open support for the Palestinians, Israel has become openly hostile to China. It has initiated a dialogue with India on how to counter China both in the West Asian region and beyond. A new Israeli think tank has been set up to focus entirely on China and its activities world-wide. This creates another opportunity for India in the region and beyond.

India has maintained good relations with Iran but it has remained well within the limits set by the US, for example, on oil purchases. These have diminished over time. The contrast with its insistence to continue and expand its oil purchases from Russia, despite US sanctions, is telling.

West Asia is India’s strategic flank. Any political unrest, armed conflict, or disruption of energy supplies from the region, can have major adverse consequences for India. This includes the festering Palestinian issue. Maintaining good relations with all major stakeholders in the region is a no-brainer, and India has pursued such relations with deftness. What it has not been able to do is to exert any significant influence in promoting longer-term peace and stability in the region, which alone can safeguard its interests. India has the right mix of distance and proximity and a network of strong bilateral relationships that are assets in pursuing a coherent regional strategy. Without such a regional strategy, India’s West Asia policy will remain reactive, focused on dealing with emerging contingencies rather than in shaping the region’s security and economic architecture.

The writer is a former foreign secretary and an honorary fellow, Centre for Policy Research