Myanmar and regional security

The civil war in the country has spilled over into India and the time may have come to review our tacit support to the junta

Myanmar is an important neighbour, critically important for India’s security and well-being. The two countries share a 1,400-km-long border and four of India’s sensitive north-eastern states — Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram — are ranged on this border north to south. There are ethnic spillovers across this border. The Nagas, Kukis, and Mizos (known as the Chins in Myanmar) are settled on either side. During the long years of insurgency afflicting India’s Northeast, several insurgent groups such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) or NSCN-K, the United Liberal Front of Asom (ULFA), and the Kuki National Council maintained sanctuaries across the border in Myanmar. 

Until the 1980s, Myanmar was also the route through which Indian insurgent groups would travel to Yunnan in southern China to acquire arms and military training. One of the reasons for India to reach out and engage with the military junta, known as the Tatmadaw, in the 1990s was to seek support in dealing with Northeast insurgency and to provide some countervailing presence to the expanding Chinese influence in the country. This meant that the earlier Indian policy of extending sympathy and support to the civilian democratic Opposition led by the iconic Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and her National League of Democracy (NLD) had to be muted. This basic posture has not been altered since then. Even when democracy was partially restored in the country in 2016 and ASSK emerged as its political leader (she held office as state counsellor), India continued to maintain strong links with the junta, recognising its role as the de facto power in the country. It helped that ASSK herself accepted the military’s powerful role behind-the-scenes. When the NLD won an overwhelming vote in the elections in 2021 and there were prospects for the democratic transition being carried forward, the Tatmadaw under its Army chief, Min Aung Hlaing, decided to launch a coup, declaring the elections results “invalid” and arresting civilian political leaders, including ASSK. She was later charged with sedition. But unlike in 1991, when the military had similarly trashed the election results, which were overwhelmingly in favour of the NLD, its rule is now under serious challenge. A virtual civil war is raging in the country and for the first time in its history, the junta is in danger of being overthrown. How has this happened?

In Myanmar’s complicated politics, there are three major players. The Tatmadaw is the most powerful and organised force. The ethnic groups, of which 17 are the major ones, are the second key player. They are ranged across the country’s periphery and have been engaged in armed resistance against the Tatmadaw since the country’s independence from the British in 1948. Some groups are secessionist. Others demand a high degree of regional autonomy. The third key player is the Burman majority, which occupies the country’s heartland and has constituted the civilian democratic opposition to the Tatmadaw. Since 1991 it has been represented by the NLD, led by ASSK. The Burman majority has also been opposed to the separatist activities of the various ethnic groups though it has been ready to accept some form of a federal polity. The ethnic groups have remained suspicious of the NLD and the Burman majority. 

Clearly in a tri-polar situation prevailing in Myanmar, if two of the key entities reach an understanding with one another, the third will be isolated and lose out. This is what happened after the 1991 elections, when the Tatmadaw, with some help from the Chinese, managed to reach arms-for-peace agreements or cease-fire agreements with most of the ethnic groups. This freed its hands to deal with the civilian Opposition with brutal force. The Tatmadaw is under threat today because of two factors. The NLD, under ASSK, was committed to non-violent means to oppose the Tatmadaw but this time round it has adopted armed resistance instead. It has set up a parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and has its own armed forces known as the People’s Defense Force (PDF). The PDF has been fighting together with the armed forces of the various ethnic groups. These include the Kachin Independence Organisation, the Karen National Union, the Karenni Progressive Party, and the Chin National Front. Some other ethnic groups have also joined hands. This includes the Triple Brotherhood Alliance of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Army, and the Arakan Army. This alliance has been responsible for a string of successes in Myanmar’s northern Shan state, bordering China. On April 11, the Thai authorities confirmed that the key border crossing between the two countries at Myawaddy, opposite Mae Sot, had fallen to forces led by the Karen National Union. The resistance forces have used armed drones to attack military facilities in the capital Naypyidaw itself. The Tatmadaw is under siege, with low morale among soldiers, who are deserting in large numbers. If the entire periphery, including the key crossing points into India, China, and Thailand are controlled by the resistance, this would become an economic choke on the junta. China has begun to play a double game, supporting the junta but at the same time making local deals with the ethnic groups controlling some of the border outposts.

The civil war in Myanmar has already spilled over into India with both Myanmar civilians and soldiers crossing over to escape the fighting. The Mizoram government has been providing shelter to their ethnic cousins from across the border. The Government of India’s decisions to fence part of the border and to suspend the free-entry regime between the two countries are unlikely to stanch this spillover. The border is long and porous. There are heavily forested areas and streams. The time may have come to review our tacit support to the junta. Perhaps there should be discreet engagement with the resistance forces and with the NUG. The latter enjoys legitimacy since it is composed of representatives elected in a free and fair election. Failure to stay ahead of the curve may have consequences for the peace and stability of our Northeast. The continuing conflict in Manipur is a warning sign.

The writer, who was foreign secretary, is a former Indian ambassador to Myanmar