Second-time unlucky: Trump's second term may be more disruptive

The world has greeted the prospect of a second Donald Trump presidency with a shrug. Compared to the outrage, the fears, and the open disdain with which his first successful election in 2016 was greeted, his triumph this month seems to be viewed with some complacency. Even among American liberals, the soul-searching is less raw and intense than it was eight years ago, and the determination to “resist” is far less visible. The general feeling appears to be that he has already been in power once, and the world did not end.

 

There are, however, good reasons to think that Mr Trump’s next turn in office will be far more disruptive than his last. Here are just four of them.

 

First, he now has an unquestionable mandate. In 2016, he lost the popular vote, and even in the electoral college fewer than 100,000 votes swung three crucial swing states in his direction. This year, by contrast, he won easily. Every major swing state went his way. He ran up bigger margins in former swing states like Florida. Democrats’ hopes that Texas would be the next swing state receded sharply as Mr Trump opened up a new lead on his challengers in the US’ second-biggest electoral prize. The Republican party seized control of the Senate, riding his coat-tails, and thus comfortably control of all three branches of government. Even traditionally Democratic areas, such as New York, saw big swings in favour of Mr Trump. In his first term, his opponents within and outside government believed that they had the moral authority and democratic obligation to constrain his actions. No such certainty can animate his opposition over the next four years.

 

Second, he has decisively broken with the traditional Republican party. In his first term, almost all of his Cabinet and White House picks were reliable party hacks. Even those from outside, like his first secretary of state Rex Tillerson or his first defence secretary Jim Mattis, could be considered to be normal imports into any Republican Cabinet — a former oil boss and a retired four-star general, respectively. The nominees whose names have been released so far reveal a very different approach governing appointments in his second term. The controversial Florida Republican Matt Gaetz will not be attorney general now that he has withdrawn his name, but there is a world of difference between an administration that starts with a conservative but mainstream Republican senator like Jeff Sessions at the Justice Department and one that was willing to nominate Mr Gaetz. Remember, Mr Sessions held the line for independent prosecution long enough to allow investigation into Russian interference in 2016 to proceed. Similar concerns could be expressed regarding Mr Trump’s picks for defence secretary, health secretary, or the director of National Intelligence. Trump 2016 was set up to be a recognisable Republican administration; Trump 2024 is settling in to be fully alt-right.

 

Third, the world in 2024 is much more dangerous than the world in 2016, with much less margin for error. The biggest foreign-policy threat during Mr Trump’s first term was North Korean missile tests. Today, not only is north-east Asia far less secure, given how much more belligerent Beijing has become, but there are fresh outbreaks of regional violence in Europe and West Asia. Either of these three flashpoints could lead to a more general global crisis.

 

And fourth, there is Mr Trump himself. He is now 78; when he first decided to run for president, he was in his mid-60s. The strains of the presidency will tell on him far more. His mind already has a tendency to wander, judging by his speeches. But he is also gathering more and more grievances as he ages. In 2016, he must have viewed the federal government as a shiny new toy with which he could play. In 2024, multiple investigations and indictments later, he will most likely view it as an enemy. The second Trump White House may turn out to be an insurgent against the state atop which it sits.

 

It is true that American domestic institutions, with one or two exceptions — the Supreme Court, in particular — largely survived Mr Trump’s first term and managed to rebuild after. Global governance suffered from his withdrawal from climate accords and his hamstringing of the World Trade Organization, but the former made little difference to the scope of climate action in the end, and the latter was a policy continued by his successor. But I would not be so quick to assume that we will be able to say the same at the end of a second Trump term.