The post-June 4 challenges

Both majority and coalition govts will have to rule by consensus henceforth

No matter who wins the Lok Sabha elections on June 4, the challenges the next government faces will be daunting. And no matter whether the government is a full-blown coalition or one led by a party with a majority of its own, these challenges will not be met without a consensus. The big politico-economic challenges cannot be overcome by parliamentary majorities alone.

Three challenges will come to the fore a year or two after the new government takes over. And there is always that perennial one — jobs. The first challenge will be the 2021 census, which has been enormously delayed due to Covid. Suspicion that the census may be used for both the parliamentary delimitation exercise, and get linked to any future demands for a National Register of Citizens (NRC) will lead to “secular” posturing. It could also trigger north-south tensions over future Lok Sabha seats and relative tax shares.

Next, there is the women’s reservation Bill, which cannot be implemented without expanding the total number of Lok Sabha seats. The Narendra Modi government, while passing the law, wisely chose to defer its implementation to the next term —i.e., after delimitation and expansion of the Lok Sabha.

The next census is going to be a political dynamite, and will need careful handling, both in its implementation, and in dealing with its wider fallout. So, at the very least, the government will have to announce in advance that its results will not lead to any covert implementation of the NRC. But even if the minorities are reassured on this score, the results of the census will decide how many seats any particular state will get. It would be a travesty if the populous Hindi belt is denied a fair increase in seats. On the other hand, it would be a political cop-out if the only consensus is to kick the can down the road, and freeze the Lok Sabha representation at current levels.

The examples of Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu will serve as a contrast. Based on current projected population levels of these two states, UP, with a population of 257 million, has just 80 seats, or 18 per cent of the Indian population of 1,410 million, and 14.7 per cent of Lok Sabha seats. Tamil Nadu gets 7.1 per cent of Lok Sabha seats with 5.7 per cent of the country’s population. How does this kind of suppressed representation of UP’s population square with the idea of one-person-one-vote in a democracy?

The counter-argument, which has been repeated endlessly by southern politicians, is that states that did well on population control should not be penalised politically. But let us see if this argument really holds. In the 1960s and 1970s, when India had a tough time feeding its millions, any good population policy would focus on lowering the total fertility rate (TFR) to 2.1, which is the replacement rate. But when India’s TFR has already dropped below 2.1 (it could be 2 or below now), and Tamil Nadu’s is 1.8 or lower, how can we use drops in TFR to decide what is good performance? If the proper goal for TFR is to help states maintain fertility in the range of 1.9-2.1 to stabilise populations, Tamil Nadu is an underperformer, not an outperformer. When the nature of the population challenge changes, the yardsticks of performance must change too. So, the claim that southern states are doing well demographically is only correct if the reference is to the situation a few decades ago. Now, with demographic degrowth as their challenge, the goalposts need to be changed.

But, of course, no Tamil Nadu politician, even those from the BJP in that state, will accept this logic without paying a huge political cost. Hence the only way out of this tricky situation is a political compromise where all states get more seats, but with the lower population states getting less than their current proportional share. And with populated states like UP and Bihar getting less than their due shares. Only political farsightedness and a spirit of consensus can deal with this issue.

The same goes for the women’s reservation legislation. If up to one-third of the men currently in Parliament, or hoping to make it there, are to yield places to women, most parties, especially the BJP, would have a revolt on their hands. But if the total number of seats were to be raised by 50 per cent, say from 543 to a little over 800, these issues will disappear. Raising the total number to over 800 also means north-south tensions can be eased, since all states will get an increase in their MPs. Some may get more and some less, but everyone will get more, except for small, single-MP states and Union Territories. An additional option is to give states losing a small share in the overall Lok Sabha seats some additional seats in the Rajya Sabha. The delimitation and women’s reservation problems can be solved only with these kinds of compromises.

The last and the most important challenge is jobs. The fact is, technology has posed a new threat. The problem is not one of no jobs, but of their quality. What tech does is damage the middle, where middle-level skills can currently yield good quality jobs. Tech impacts the jobs market both positively and negatively. At the top end, high-skilled jobs are in huge demand. At the bottom, since tech makes most jobs simpler (consider your Swiggy delivery boy or the Uber driver), it opens up more opportunities for the relatively unskilled. These minor skills can be acquired rather easily with small investments in time and money. But the increase in the supply of low-skilled workers for jobs puts pressure on wages. The jobs that are harder to come by are the relatively cushier ones in offices and shop floors (banks, manufacturing, telecoms, lower-end tech coding, and the like), which is what makes for a strong middle class. Tech will polarise incomes towards higher upper incomes and lower middle-income jobs. The middle-middle class is under threat.

The answer to this challenge is not just upskilling, but region-specific skilling. This means issues about jobs must also focus on sub-state regions like districts or municipalities, where opportunities may be region-specific, and this requires more devolution of power not only from the Centre to the states, but from states to local bodies. The kind of jobs that can come up in the Mumbai metropolitan region will not be the same as those that can happen in arid and rural Marathwada or Mizoram. They need different approaches.

Whoever wins, these issues cannot be solved through legislative majorities, but through widespread discussions among all stakeholders. A tall order, regardless of whether Mr Modi comes back to power with a majority or some weak coalition does. But that is what the stars foretell.

The writer is editorial director, Swarajya magazine