Diplomatic clash

Canada's internal politics is harming its relations with India

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s accusation that the “agents of the government of India” were responsible for the assassination in June this year of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a pro-Khalistan leader, the mutual expulsion of diplomats, and a pause in trade talks earlier this month mark further downward steps in the slide in India-Canada relations due to differences over the politics of the Sikh separatist movement. The frosty personal relations were well in evidence at the recent G20 leaders’ summit, where Mr Trudeau skipped the dinner and held talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi only on the sidelines.

Prima facie, Mr Trudeau’s allegation of India’s involvement in Nijjar’s murder appears to be weak — he speaks of “credible allegations” rather than clinching evidence and is yet to share any proof, though his government promises to do so “in due course”. It is significant that Mr Trudeau has chosen to sound out US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak — two of Canada’s critical partners in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (Australia and New Zealand being the other two) that also have close strategic partnerships with India. Both countries have seen attacks on Indian missions by Khalistani forces — in San Francisco and London. Notably, they have not been particularly active in closing down Khalistani activities (in the interests of freedom of expression) any more than Canada.

This sensitivity is embedded in serial developments, starting with Mr Trudeau’s disastrous 2018 official visit to India, when he was cold-shouldered by the Indian government for inviting a member of a banned Sikh extremist organisation who had been convicted of attempted murder of an Indian minister (the person concerned was subsequently disinvited). That apart, Mr Trudeau’s statement that Canada’s Parliament had more Sikhs (18) than India’s (13) has not helped matters. His dependence on a Sikh-led New Democratic Party to stay in power, evidence of the disproportionate power of this community relative to its share of the population, has also weakened any inclination his government might have had to address India’s concern. It is notable, for instance, that detailed references to Sikh extremism and Khalistan in Canada’s annual terror threat report in 2018 were dropped in a revised report in 2019 under pressure from the Sikh community, including four Sikh MPs in his government.

It is unclear how far this diplomatic tension will play out for the vast Indian diaspora in Canada or Indian students attending Canadian universities. So far, there has been no diminution in the number of visas granted to students, though the two countries have been more circumspect about paperwork for intelligence officials. Economic relations, too, have been sub-optimal. Canada is the seventh-largest source of foreign portfolio investment, but bilateral trade has not been significant — India’s exports to Canada were just $4.11 billion in 2022-23 and imports from there $4.17 billion. A comprehensive trade agreement was expected to broaden these ties. India’s dependence on Canada for pulses, though 30 per cent at present, has been steadily reducing in favour of Australia following a trade agreement. Ultimately, larger geopolitical concern in the Indo-Pacific may influence the trajectory of this relationship.