Safety first

Railways must address the basics

The tragic collision between the Sealdah (Kolkata)-bound Kanchanjunga Express and a goods train in northern Bengal suggests that the Indian Railways has not taken on board the lessons from the three-train crash in Balasore, Odisha, just a year ago, which resulted in significant casualties. The cause of one of India’s worst train crashes in decades was the result of flaws in the signalling system. Now, preliminary investigation by the Railways into the Kanchanjunga Express tragedy, in which 10 people have died and over 50 injured, suggests that the accident was caused by a defective automatic signalling system compounded by speeding violations by the driver (since deceased) of the goods train.

Fortuitously, the rear compartments of the Kanchanjunga Express were parcel coaches, which limited the number of casualties. Because of the signalling system failure, both the passenger train, which plies between Kolkata and Agartala, and the goods train were issued a mandatory written order (known as a TA 912), which authorises drivers to pass automatic red signals after observing standard safety protocols. This involves bringing the train to a stop ahead of a signal, waiting one minute in the daytime or two minutes at night, and proceeding at a maximum speed of 10 km per hour after exchanging a confirmatory whistle with the guard and maintaining a 150-metre gap with a preceding train if the latter has not yet crossed a signal. According to the investigation, the driver of the goods train did not observe the speed limit and crashed into the rear of the Kanchanjunga Express, which had crossed nine signals and was awaiting clearance at another to proceed.

Human error or otherwise, the accident still raises fresh questions about the Railways’ attention to basics. As with the accident in Balasore, Kavach, the automatic train-protection anti-collision system indigenously developed by the Indian Railways Research Designs and Standards Organisation, was not operational on this line, either. The electronic system is designed to activate the train’s braking system automatically if the driver fails to follow speed restrictions. But the system is functional only on 1,500 km of track — the Railways has a track length of 99,000 km — and the utility plans to add it to another 3,000 km this year. Such snail’s pace progress must surely be questioned when signal failures are emerging as a crisis point in railway operations. The Railways has seen a massive increase in capital expenditure and it must pay adequate attention to safety aspects.

It is true that the incidence of “consequential” train accidents — those involving the loss of life, injuries, disruptions, and damage to railway property — has fallen by 90 per cent in the past two decades. But at an average of 44 consequential accidents every year — or three or four a month — in the five-year period ended FY23, the Railways cannot be deemed an entirely safe way to travel. By comparison, there have been only few air accidents in India in this century. Surely, the same level of safety standards enjoyed by a sliver of affluent Indians should be accorded to the 90 per cent of the population, who avail themselves of one of the world’s largest mass transport systems.