After the ninth meeting last week of the governing body of the NITI Aayog, an “approach paper” that purported to detail a “vision for Viksit Bharat” by 2047 was released. This is, of course, a buzzword and target that has been repeated several times by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It is important, therefore, to evaluate what the government’s think tank believes is necessary to make this vision a reality. A tone of great confidence pervades the document, born of the belief that “India has made visible strides in its transformation journey and is now ready for take-off”. But many argue that India has been taxiing on the runway for at least two decades; takeoff still seems some distance away.
Much of the paper talks about the record of the past decade, and shows that India “has demonstrated quantum leap capabilities”. This is in the context of the expansion of Jan Dhan accounts, the achievements of Chandrayaan, and even the medal tally at the Asian Games. While all these are worthy of pride, they and other examples do not necessarily add up to a game plan for economic development. Much of the rest of the paper examines what a “Viksit Bharat” could possibly mean; it claims that a “national level … consultative process, involving almost 15 lakh contributors, has led to the preparation of a template for a Vision for Viksit Bharat@2047”. However, these attributes and aspirations probably did not require such deep consultation, as they include such popular demands as clean drinking water, skills for all, and a vibrant rural economy. If anything, the section on “internal challenges” is most relevant; these include fixing the energy sector, rural-urban inequality, and industrial competitiveness. However, suggestions on how these should be addressed need to be worked out.
In the end, it is economic targets that are most important, since it is growth that will provide the resources to address the other “Viksit Bharat” aspirations. Here the paper says “we need to strive to be a U$30 trillion economy by 2047 with a per capita income of US$18,000 per annum”. However, growth will need to approach double digits and stay high for this to be a reality. The examples of such growth provided in the paper — which include Japan, Germany, Singapore, and South Korea but, interestingly, not China — all had decades of high growth, catalysed by dramatic institutional and societal changes. Singapore reformed its bureaucracy; South Korea pioneered new forms of private-public partnership; Japan completely adopted Western liberal norms in its public sphere, regulation, and judiciary. China, after the 1970s, also had a similar process in that its governance was opened up, private profit was permitted, and decisions were decentralised.
Without comparable shifts to Indian institutions, it is hard to achieve similar sustained growth. India’s ossified bureaucratic structure, for example, delays decision-making and does not prioritise expertise or experience: Clearly, administrative reform is overdue. Multiple institutions need transformation. The judicial process takes too long; law enforcement is erratic and arbitrary; the third level of government is underfunded and lacks accountability. Social shifts — such as a greater willingness to see females in the workforce — might be even more difficult to implement. All these will need political and social consensus that the NITI Aayog should work harder to build up.