One of the most enduring images of Zhao Ziyang, flashed many times over worldwide, is of a pensive Zhao, with a young Wen Jiabao (later China’s Premier since 2003) in tow, addressing the pro-student demonstrators in the early hours of May 19, 1989, the day martial law was announced in China. The rest, as they say, is history.
Zhao Ziyang came, conquered in a hurry and then disappeared equally fast from the top echelons of China. He vanished from the public eye in 1989 after the Tiananmen massacre and his existence became a misty blur in China’s memory. The annals of history may remember Zhao Ziyang differently — this book would play an important role in that regard. The book should also be disconcerting to China’s present political dispensation, as it advocates parliamentary democracy as the way forward for the country.
Zhao was the liberal, pro-student face of China, willing to wager his position to side publicly with the students — so much so detractors said that he had the gall to set up the “second headquarters” under Deng Xiaoping’s living presence. But this stance led to his purge and eventual downfall. He spent the remaining years of his life under house arrest, and died in 2005.
In the interim years, there was very little on or about him that streamed out of China. But Zhao secretly recorded a personal account of the Tiananmen years — the complex power games, the intense factionalism and cliques — on old tapes lying around in the house which eventually found their way out of China, and have now been published in this excellent volume. The prime importance of this book lies in the fact that it provides an alternate reading of China’s political and economic history leading up to the Tiananmen explosion. It provides an insider’s sharp insight on China politics as well crucial markers to assess the historical contributions of Deng Xiaoping who, despite his outstanding economic legacy, scarred and obliterated a generation of youthful optimism.
For those not well-versed with China politics, Zhao’s rise as General Secretary of the Communist Party was meteoric. As Zhao himself admits, he had few guanxi (networks) in the centre. Zhao was somewhat of a household name in the early reform years because of successful agrarian reforms in Guangdong and Sichuan (Deng Xiaoping’s home province). It was this reputation which prompted Deng to bring him to the centre as Premier in 1980 and subsequently his success led to his elevation as the General Secretary of the Party.
Emboldened under Deng’s tutelage, Zhao pushed for a shift to contractual household farming. He was also the brainchild behind the famous line used so often by Deng: “One focus, two basic points,” which meant economic construction, with reform and open door as the two kegs of development. He was also the architect of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) policy.
Zhao notes that rival cliques fought to influence Deng. He portrays Deng as a conflicted patriarch who had to manoeuvre and arbitrate between opposing camps of conservatives and reformists. Interestingly he points out that Deng could not, despite his supremacy, neutralise several of his comrades, the revolutionary veterans who continued to have an exacting presence within the Party. Zhao indicates that though Deng was the only “mother-in-law” (as Chinese say to imply the only one powerful enough) of the Politburo Standing Commitee, he had to consult with the old guard on all major issues.
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Conflicted Deng might have been, but clearly, as Zhao points out, the Party verdict to characterise the 1989 Tiananmen student movement as counter-revolutionary was Deng’s decision, a decision he did not reverse despite pressure. Zhao seems to suggest Deng might have been motivated to do so under the influence of the hardliner Li Peng who, it seems, led Deng to believe that the students targeted Deng personally. Students had, in fact, raised questions as to why the Politburo needed to report to Deng at all (who held no office).
Zhao also sheds light on Deng’s views on political reform which, according to him, indicated administrative reforms geared to accentuate “the vitality and efficiency of the Communist Party.” Deng thought that China had an edge in having a system without restrictions or checks and balances (on the Party), and saw absolute concentration of power as “overall advantageous”.
As the Chinese Communist Party celebrates 60 years in power, Zhao’s book is an important chronicle of contemporary China politics and a look at how things work within the Party from an insider’s perspective. Amidst unprecedented challenges from the economic recession (which has put about 15-20 mn people out of work), and the Tibetan and Uighur ethnic explosions, the Party needs to introspect and learn lessons if it is to avoid another Tiananmen. As China modernises, the Party will need to figure out how to accommodate the aspirations of its populace. This year public opinion forced the government to backtrack on the plan to control the web which is a portent of things to come.
PRISONER OF THE STATE
THE SECRET JOURNAL OF ZHAO ZIYANG
Tr and Ed Bao Pu, Renee Chiang & Adi Ignatius
Simon & Schuster; 306pp; $40
