The road to perdition

Major General Ashok Mehta has written an interesting and lively account of the Iraq war. With his experience of covering the Kargil conflict in 1999 and Operation Prakaram in 2001-02, he was ideally suited to cover the war in Iraq for Kochi's Mangalam newspaper.

In a manner of speaking, his task was made easier by the number of TV channels, radio reporters and newsmen reportingfrom inside war-torn Iraq's capital Baghdad. This, indeed, was bizarre. It was for the first time that reporters were able to cover live the war from inside enemy country.

As is to be expected, the daily despatches covered Operation Iraqi Freedom on a day-to-day basis based on media reports emanating from correspondents in Baghdad's Palestine Hotel and "embedded" reporters. This part then is factual reporting of the operations.

At that point of time it would not have been possible to obtain either the coalition forces' operational plan, nor for that matter Iraq's strategy to defend its country. General Mehta's narrative, therefore, covers only the factual details of American and British formations advancing on two separate axes to Baghdad.

That President Saddam Hussein, enfeebled by his of mindless war with Iran in 1979-87, his misadventure in Kuwait in 1991 resulting in economic sanctions and arms embargo, could hope to take on the world's mightiest war machine borders on insanity and madness.

And to crown his folly, he had not prepared his country for the war. There were no lines of defence, no obstacles or mines laid, and no overall strategic or tactical plan of defence. Perhaps General Mehta could have informed the readers of his understanding of these lacunae.

General Mehta has very diligently marshalled the details of the awesome military might that the coalition forces, primarily the US, had concentrated for its Iraqi war. This in itself was a great logistics feat.

Against this, except for the total strength of the Iraqi forces opposing the coalition, the author does not tell us much about the state of the Iraqi army's morale, state of readiness and the condition of its fighting machines, that is, aircraft, tanks, artillery, radars, small arms and the like.

General Mehta has laid great emphasis on the employment of American Special Forces both before and after the war, but he has failed to enlighten us of their contribution to the war effort.

If they had indeed infiltrated Iraq then they should have informed their higher command of the almost complete lack of preparation for war in Iraq, or fortifying big cities like Basra or Baghdad to withstand a siege a la Stalingrad during World War II. And what have the Special Forces achieved post-War?

They have not been able to neutralise centres of Iraqi uprisings taking a heavy toll of coalition troops and civil population. The coalition forces, primarily the Americans, are sinking deeper and deeper in fighting a guerrilla warfare.

General Mehta has rightly brought out the differences in approach between the US and the UK governments post the capture of Baghdad. The British government with its past association with the region was more pragmatic as opposed to the Americans who behaved like conquerors.

The author concludes his book with lessons drawn from this unequal conflict that will be of importance should similar conflicts take place in the future.

He lauds the speed of advance of America's 5 Corps "" 600 km in seven days "" as one of the fastest in modern times. It must be remembered there was no Iraqi opposition worth the name.

In fact, it appeared more like a peace-time training exercise. Anyone with a little knowledge of military affairs would not have given more than two to three weeks for it to end. The battle casualties suffered "" 110 by the Americans, 30 by the British Army and 2,300 by the Iraqi Army "" does not speak of any major battle throughout the war.

At the end of it all one has to search deeper into the reasons underlying the subjugation of Iraq. The country was searched with a toothcomb by a team of UN weapons inspectors but no weapons of mass destruction were found, not even after it was defeated and occupied. Was it to effect a regime change?

America has a dubious record of supporting dictators/monarchs wherever it suits its strategic or economic interests. Whereas America's military action and regime change in Afghanistan was hailed the world over, instead there were rallies around the world (including the US and UK) against the proposed war in Iraq. The only plausible reason could be America's control of the Gulf oil, its hegemony over the region leading to domination of the Central Asian economic wealth.

America to its discomfiture finds itself in a situation not dissimilar to what happened in Vietnam. It has lost more to terrorists and guerrillas after the end of the war, and the recent revelation of tortures inflicted on hapless Iraqi prisoners has greatly embarrassed the governments of US and UK.

War Despatches is a useful book in understanding the Iraqi war as it unfolded and the factors that guide a mighty power to achieve its political and economic aims by other means. It is hoped that with more information available on the war plans and the geo-political compulsions guiding the policies of the big powers, a more analytical and in-depth study of the Iraq War will be published some day.

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WAR DESPATCHES: Operation Iraqi Freedom

Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta
Har-Anand
Price: Rs 395,
Pages: 216